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In response to increasing demands on firm performance, organizations have 
attempted to become more consumer and market responsive by adopting industry 
conventions, such as appointing a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the top management 
team (TMT). However, scholarly research on the presence or absence of a CMO, and the 
relationship between the presence of a CMO on the TMT and firm performance is 
nascent and conflicting. Thus, the purpose of these studies was to address these issues. 
First, using institutional theory I empirically examined the conditions of firm visibility, 
firm market power, and industry orientation to predict CMO presence / absence on a 
firm’s TMT. Second, using signaling theory I examined the same conditions under which 
CMO presence / absence leads to enhanced firm performance. Empirical testing was 
performed on a sample of U.S. based public firms over a two year period. Firm visibility 
and market power were found to help predict and explain the presence of a CMO on the 
TMT. While no direct effect of CMO presence on firm performance was observed, 
empirical support was found that suggests moderating relationships exist between CMO 
presence and firm performance, for example, the moderating influence of CMO presence 
on the relationship between firm visibility and firm performance. These findings add to 
and expand on limited knowledge about CMO presence on the TMT. In addition, prior 
CMO research utilized two definitions of a CMO – a “titled” CMO and someone with 





each study suggests important differences exist between the two. Understanding these 
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In response to increasing demands on firm performance, organizations have 
attempted to become more consumer and market responsive by adopting industry 
conventions such as appointing a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the top management 
team (TMT) (McGovern, Court, Quelch, & Crawford, 2004). However, despite the 
frequent addition of CMOs to the C-level suite, two troublesome observations regarding 
CMOs remain. First, why do only 23% of Fortune 1000 companies have a CMO in place 
(Spencer Stuart, 2013). Second, scholarly research on (1) the presence or absence of a 
CMO and (2) the relationship between the presence of a CMO on the TMT and firm 
performance is nascent.  
Thus, the purpose of this dissertation is to address these concerns. First, I 
theoretically and empirically examine the environmental conditions under which a CMO 
is present on a firm’s TMT. Second, I theoretically and empirically examine the 
conditions under which CMO presence leads to enhanced firm performance. More 
specifically, I examine two primary questions: (1) What factors influence a CMO’s 
presence on a firm’s TMT? and (2) Under what conditions does CMO presence moderate 
the impact of firm performance? In doing so, my examination seeks to help explain why 
some firms may have a CMO on the TMT and why prior research has reported 





The primary theory employed for Essay 1 is institutional theory. Though limited 
in its appearance in conventional marketing literature, this theory is instrumental in 
shaping the rationale and hypothesis for firm structure, behavior, and performance with 
regard to the presence of a CMO on the TMT (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory provides a solid framework on which to build and 
recognize the power of isomorphism to shape organizational behavior in an effort by the 
organization to gain legitimacy and, ultimately, drive firm performance (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). This theory recognizes that organizations conform 
to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the external environment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and, as such, provides explanatory power for the 
forces and rationale behind the presence of a CMO on a TMT. Institutional theory is also 
particularly helpful when making comparisons between firms because external factors, 
such as industry characteristics and industry orientation, are central to the reasons 
differences in the TMT structure may exist. 
The theory employed for Essay 2 is signaling theory. Signaling theory describes 
the process decision makers use to resolve information asymmetry in competitive 
environments (Spence, 1973). Signaling theory recognizes that individuals as well as 
firms send signals to reduce information asymmetry because signals convey information 
to outsiders and influence their perceptions (Clarkson, 1995; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & 
Reutzel, 2011; Freeman, 1984; Jones & Murrell, 2001). Thus, my two essay dissertation 
seeks to build on the limited body of TMT research that examines the value of a CMO by 
offering empirical data to help identify conditions under which a CMO is present on the 









PREDICTING THE PRESENCE OF CHIEF MARKETING OFFICERS (CMOs)  




Institutional theory proposes that it is in an organization’s best interest to conform 
to the rules and belief systems prevailing in the external environment (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Institutional theory applies these rules and belief 
systems to the composition of top management teams (TMTs) (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Williamson & Cable, 2003). However, not all TMTs are 
the same in terms of a firm’s functional or managerial structure. This is especially true 
when examining the presence or absence of a chief marketing officer (CMO) on the 
TMT. The presence of a CMO on the TMT may be beneficial to the firm because the 
appointment of a CMO has been viewed as (1) an indicator of the corporate status of 
marketing at the firm level, (2) signifying corporate adoption of the marketing concept, 
and (3) a proxy for the market power of the firm (Hise, 1965; Kerin, 2005; Mann, 1971; 
Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Piercy, 1986; Webster, Malter, & Ganesan, 2003).  
This study theoretically and empirically demonstrates the environmental 






More specifically, I hypothesize and empirically examine key factors that serve as 
antecedents to the presence of a CMO on the TMT in an attempt to explain why some 
TMTs have a CMO presence while others do not. Prior research has shown that firms’ 
structural choices of the TMT are largely functional in nature and even utilitarian in 
purpose. For example, Hambrick and Cannella (2004) found that TMT composition 
draws a distinction between strategy formulation and implementation. More specifically, 
Zorn (2004) found an increased prevalence of Chief Financial Officers on TMTs when 
firms were faced with financial reporting complexity. However, structural choices within 
the TMT can provide other highly desirable benefits. For example, structural choices in 
the TMT have been shown to favorably influence investors’ perceptions of future firm 
performance to the extent that they garner prestige and influence organizational 
legitimacy (Certo & Hodge, 2007). Thus, the structure of the TMT is a way of presenting 
attributes of the firm that are legitimizing (Zott & Huy, 2007). However, scholarly 
marketing research that explains the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT is scarce 
and has yet to address Moorman and Rust’s (1999) call to examine the reasons and 
rationale for the presence of senior management with specialization in marketing on the 
TMT.  
 The CMO position embodies the highest position of leadership within the 
marketing function of a corporation and, as such, has direct responsibility for providing 
strategic leadership in the marketing activities of a firm (Boyd, Chandy, & Cunha, 2010). 
The informational, decisional, and relational roles of the CMO help firms increase their 
competitive capabilities in ways that can lead to enhanced firm value (Boyd et al., 2010), 





2008). In addition, the CMO is often considered the “voice of the consumer” on the TMT 
(Court, 2007). For example, Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) suggest that family-named 
firms are more likely to have a CMO on the TMT where the voice of the consumer is 
greater because family-named firms place a greater emphasis on maintaining a favorable 
image of the firm and a positive perception of the corporate brand among consumers. 
Nath and Mahajan (2008) empirically identify several internal organizational 
factors or central tendencies (e.g., firm innovativeness) that predict CMO presence on the 
TMT. However, as with most extant research on the management structure of the TMT 
(Pettigrew, 1992), their work does not address the environmental context of the firm, 
which may influence whether or not a TMT has a CMO. The purpose of this research is 
to advance the scholarly literature by theoretically predicting and empirically examining 
the environmental conditions under which a CMO is most likely to be present on a TMT. 
Previous research on CMO presence has largely focused on the internal dynamics of the 
firm. In contrast, I examined environmental antecedents of CMO presence on the TMT 
for 572 publicly traded U.S. firms from 2010 and 2011 using the theoretical prism of 
institutional theory.  
 
Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
Institutional Theory 
Institutional theory recognizes that organizations conform to the rules, structures, 
practices, and belief systems prevailing in the external environment and within social 





because they believe that institutional isomorphism earns them legitimacy (Dacin, 1997; 
Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Suchman (1995, p. 574) defines legitimacy as a 
“perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and 
definitions.” Kostova and Zaheer (1999) further define organizational legitimacy as the 
acceptance of an organization by its external environment, such as when an organization 
is deemed proper and appropriate (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Meyer & Scott, 1983).   
Prior research (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Roberts & Greenwood, 1997) has 
conceptualized two forms of organizational legitimization—cognitive and 
sociopolitical—but they are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Ensley & Hmieleski, 
2005). Cognitive legitimization refers to the level of public knowledge about the firm, 
while sociopolitical legitimization is the extent to which key stakeholders and governing 
bodies accept a firm as appropriate with respect to existing norms and laws (Ensley & 
Hmieleski, 2005).   
 Researchers have linked the importance of organizational legitimacy to firm 
growth and survival (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977); when enhanced, organizational 
legitimacy reduces uncertainty about institutional environments (Selznick, 1957), both 
informationally and symbolically (Finkelstein, 1992). Institutional theory is particularly 
applicable to investigating TMTs because their prestige influences organizational 
legitimacy (Certo & Hodge, 1997; D’Aveni, 1991) and even the potential of the firm, as 
viewed by external markets (Bharadwaj, Bharadwaj, & Konsynski, 1999; Spence, 1973). 
In seeking legitimacy, firms often look to other firms they perceive as successful and 





 Firms imitate competitive strategies in a process DiMaggio and Powell (1983) 
call “mimetic isomorphism.” Mimetic isomorphism is both a process and a state in which 
firms seek and achieve conformity. Firms achieve this through imitation of structures, 
practices, and belief systems that prevail in the external environment and within social 
networks, which are considered sources of legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Haveman, 1993; Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Mimetic isomorphism is most prevalent when 
organizations are faced with ambiguity or environmental uncertainty (Cyert & March, 
1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Mizruchi & Fein, 1999; Williamson & Cable, 2003). 
Firms undertake mimetic isomorphism because it can be an advantageous and an 
economical path to a viable problem solution (Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Institutional theory and mimetic isomorphism help explain why firm 
managers look to industry norms, firm traditions, and management trends, among other 
things, to formulate organizational structures and policies (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1987). Such policies may include the TMT structure and 
the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT. 
 
Role of the CMO in the TMT 
  The sheer volume of scholarly examination over the past 50 years is evidence of 
the importance that both academics and practitioners ascribe to the functionality of the 
TMT. The definition of a TMT in most extant research is directionally based on Cyert 
and March’s (1963) theoretical construct “dominant coalition,” which recognizes that 
executives set firm direction and influence organizational performance through the 





in the TMT are largely functional, but they can provide organizational legitimacy (Certo 
& Hodge, 2007; D’Aveni, 1991; D’Aveni & Kesner, 1993) through structural 
isomorphism (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995).   
  Top managers with functional expertise are viewed as experts in that area and are 
deemed in the best position to deal with environmental dependencies and critical 
contingencies (Finkelstein, 1992). When managerial structures include a CMO on the 
TMT, the CMO is viewed as providing (1) strategic leadership for the marketing 
activities performed by the firm (Boyd et al., 2010) and (2) assistance to the TMT when 
faced with market complexity (Court, 2007; Nath & Mahajan, 2008). The leadership 
ability and character of the top marketing executive are also empirically associated with 
the overall success of the marketing function of the firm (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009).   
The title “chief marketing officer” was first bestowed in the 1950s, but its 
widespread use is a reasonably recent occurrence (Koleszar, 2009). Hopkins and Bailey 
(1984) were among the first scholars to identify and empirically verify antecedents of the 
presence of marketing leadership on the TMT in their analysis of 294 large companies. 
Their measure was the presence or absence of a chief marketing executive (CME) on the 
TMT. This person often held the title of “vice president of marketing” or “director of 
marketing” and reported directly to the chairman, president, or chief executive officer 
(CEO) 68% of the time (Hopkins & Bailey, 1984). Hopkins and Bailey further reported 
that a CME presence stemmed from the homogeneity of business units or markets due to 
the need for differentiation while the heterogeneity of business units or markets resulted 





More recently, Nath and Mahajan (2008) empirically identified six internal 
organizational factors that influence the adoption of TMT structures that included a 
CMO. They found that innovativeness, differentiation, branding strategy, diversification, 
functional experience of the TMT, and whether the CEO is an outsider each contributed 
to the presence of a CMO on the TMT. When disparate organizations in the same line of 
business are structured into an actual operational field, powerful forces emerge that lead 
them to become even more similar to one another (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). The force 
of structural isomorphism, according to DiMaggio and Powell (1983), also extends to 
personnel flows and paths within an organizational field. The existence of common 
career titles is but one example of structural isomorphism that DiMaggio and Powell cite. 
 Therefore, I propose that structural isomorphism (Dacin, 1997; Deephouse, 1996; 
Suchman, 1995) is a significant determinant of the adoption of managerial structures that 
include a CMO on the TMT when firms want to obtain, maintain, or increase firm 
legitimacy. This perspective is directly supported by institutional theory and indirectly by 
the findings of Williamson and Cable (2003), who demonstrate that TMT mimetic 
isomorphism shapes TMT hiring patterns. By leveraging the explanatory power of 
institutional theory, I am able to examine and predict how the theoretical constructs of 
firm visibility, market power, and industry orientation (i.e., differentiation) directly affect 
the likelihood of CMO presence on the TMT. The model in Figure 1 shows the 








Figure 1  




Firm Visibility and CMO Presence in the Firm 
 Visibility is important to firms for several financial reasons, including that it helps 
reduce the risk associated with uncertainty (Barry & Brown, 1986), reduces the cost of 
capital (Merton, 1987), and helps attract a wider following by investors and information 
intermediaries (Bushee & Miller, 2012). Baker, Powell, and Weaver (1999) suggest that 
firm visibility can be defined as the degree to which analysts follow, and institutions 
hold, a firm’s stock. A firm that is followed by many professional financial analysts is 
likely to be highly visible to investors (Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001).   
 In addition to providing information and investment recommendations to 
investors (Zuckerman, 1999), analysts strive to enhance their perceived value in the 
marketplace by identifying mispriced securities (O'Brien & Bhushan, 1990). As a result, 
there is growing realization among analysts that intangible assets such as brand equity, 
technology applications, customer loyalty, and customer satisfaction are important 











type of information is not typically captured or reported in formal financial disclosure 
statements. As such, the analyst must seek out other reliable sources to aid in more 
accurate firm valuation.  
 Prior research has also shown that analysts influence managers’ and firms’ 
behaviors and strategies (Rao & Sivakumar, 1999; Zuckerman, 1999). Analysts’ 
recommendations can affect firms’ strategies and actions indirectly through their 
influences on investors’ behaviors and resulting stock prices and more directly by 
exerting pressure on managers through interactions during earnings conference calls and 
meetings (Benner, 2010). Therefore, because TMTs constitute the boundary between an 
organization and its environment (Keck & Tushman, 1993), a key managerial task is to 
select organizational structures and strategies that strike a balance between competitive 
and institutional demands (Chen & Hambrick, 1995; Deephouse, 1999).   
Thus, for publicly traded firms, institutional theory (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) 
predicts that as firms seek cognitive legitimization (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Suchman, 
1995), analyst and capital market actors will respond in kind to their quest for legitimacy 
and demand greater information and apply increased coercive pressure as a result of the 
legitimization process. As such, I propose that this will lead firms to adopt a TMT 
structure that includes a CMO because the presence of a CMO will provide analysts and 
capital market actors access to unique insights and information about the firm’s 
intangible assets, such as marketing strategies, or higher levels of customer satisfaction 
(Barth et al., 1998; Luo, Homburg, & Wieseke, 2010), ultimately meeting the analysts’ 
demands for greater information. Thus, I propose the following:  
H1: Firm visibility is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that 





Market Power and CMO Presence in the Firm 
 
 Market power reflects a firm’s ability to influence the actions of others in a 
product-market (Harrigan, 1983; Makhija, 2003; Shervani, Frazier, & Challagalla, 2007). 
A firm’s market power is a joint function of its horizontal and vertical clout and the 
capabilities of its internal departments (Steiner, 2008). Market power can be acquired 
simply by virtue of size; by definition, large organizations enjoy greater market power 
than small firms (Boone, Carroll, & Van Witteloostuijn, 2004; Haveman, 1993). Market 
power can result from the presence of structural barriers that deter entry for new 
competition or target markets derived from industry characteristics (Bain, 1956; Morris, 
1996). Fewer producers also result in a concentration of market power (Alvarado, 
Overbye, & Sauer, 1999).  
To enhance firm market power, firms must (1) differentiate their product offerings 
(Porter, 1980) and (2) effectively communicate their product’s unique advantage to 
customers (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003). These two tasks call for skill and experience in 
segmentation, targeting, and positioning (Nath & Mahajan, 2008), key domains of the 
marketing function. 
Ultimately, market power is the ability of firms to elevate price above marginal 
cost to earn economic profits in excess of competitive levels (Cotterill, Franklin, & Ma, 
1996), or what economists call “rents.” According to the U.S. Department of Justice and 
Federal Trade Commission (1992), a firm possesses market power when it can maintain 






To do this, Kerin, Mahajan, and Varadarajan (1990) suggest firms selectively 
choose markets in which to compete and strategically deploy their resources, such as 
advertising, to exploit their market power to achieve effective product differentiation. 
Advertising intensity is widely acknowledged as an effective and efficient method to 
achieve product differentiation, increasing firm profit levels (Connor & Mueller, 1982). 
Porter (1976) empirically demonstrates the capacity of advertising to differentiate 
products, elevate profits, and create barriers to entry.  
Likewise, research and development (R&D) is a valuable strategic asset that 
enables firms to generate superior return on investments (Chesbrough, 2003). However, it 
is the simultaneous investment in higher levels of R&D and advertising relative to 
industry norms that enables firms to engage in effective product differentiation, 
generating superior organizational performance (Krishnan, Tadepalli, & Park, 2009). 
 Thus, the literature suggests that market power is related to the firm’s ability to 
achieve differentiation (Hay, 2008; Matraves & Rondi, 2007; Morris, 1996), and 
differentiation is related to the likelihood of CMO presence on a firm’s TMT (Nath & 
Mahajan, 2008). Moreover, the strategic and tactical deployment of the firm’s valuable 
resources falls within the domain of the marketing function (Hyde, Landry & Tipping, 
2004) but is best leveraged by “corporate-level distinctive competencies” (Hitt & Ireland, 
1985, p. 289). Thus, I propose the following: 
H2: Firm market power is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure 









Industry Orientation and CMO Presence in the Firm 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) assert that isomorphism is promoted through 
intensified interaction within an organizational field, commonly an industry. From this 
perspective, industry characteristics become constraints within which firms adapt or 
perish (Aldrich, 1979; Christensen & Montgomery, 1981; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
Meyer and Rowan (1977) propose that a significant amount of organizational structure is 
due to environmental pressures and/or the desire for legitimacy (which is achieved 
through conformity with institutional and cultural environments of the firm). Lees (1997) 
extends the perspective that the major determinants of organizational structure lie outside 
(rather than inside) the organization and proposes that as organizations become more 
isomorphic, eventually they must behave as their environment dictates to maintain 
legitimacy. Evidence also suggests that institutional pressures to organize in certain ways 
are stronger in some industries than in others (Boeker, 1989; Eisenhardt, 1988; Palmer, 
Jennings, & Zhou, 1993). 
Industry orientation, relative to the degree of differentiation inherent within an 
industry, can lead to environmental pressure that, in turn, influences firm choices. For 
example, highly differentiated industries, such as high-technology, provide the firm more 
avenues for competition and a broader array of possible competitive actions (Porter, 
1980), but they are also more dependent on discretionary consumer consumption than 
others (McGahan & Porter, 1997). Firms competing in highly differentiated industries 
tend to seek ways to differentiate their offerings; as such, they often concentrate their 
resources like R&D on product innovations (Plehn-Dujowich, 2009) rather than on 





Industry effects also exist at the corporate level (Hitt & Ireland, 1985). However, 
only a few studies (Datta, Guthrie, & Rajagopalan, 2002; Datta & Rajagopalan, 1998; 
Guthrie & Olian, 1991; Pfeffer & Leblebici, 1973; Rajagopalan & Datta, 1996) have 
examined the role of industry in executive staffing decisions such as those of the TMT. 
Researchers have long suggested and supported the importance of functional diversity in 
the TMT (Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Pegels, Song, & Yang, 2000; Weinzimmer, 2000; 
Weinzimmer, Bond, Houston, & Nystrom, 2003; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). Functional 
diversity on the TMT has been shown to stimulate wider discussion and debate about the 
different ways to focus the activities of the company and leads to more innovative, 
higher-quality solutions (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Hambrick, Cho, & Ming-Jer, 1996). 
Functional diversity and expertise serve as the lens through which the TMT views, 
interprets, and makes sense of the business environment (Day & Lord, 1992).  
Leveraging functional expertise in the TMT, particularly marketing expertise, has 
been linked to the creation of shareholder value (Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The presence 
of marketing expertise on the TMT is believed to play a unique role by focusing firm 
attention and resources on the consumer, assessing market attractiveness, and developing 
strategic assets through innovation (Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Day, 1992; Kerin, 2005; 
Webster, 1992; Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The success of firms competing in 
differentiated industries is dependent on producing products that stand out from 
competitors’ products on product features, quality, and design (Guthrie & Datta, 2008). 
Marketing’s role is to create differentiation, preference, and loyalty (Webster, 1992). 
These factors fall within the purview of a CMO because marketing is the corporate area 





presence of a CMO on the TMT provides critical insights into customer-linking 
capabilities (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Finally, the appointment of a CMO is valued by 
investors (Boyd et al., 2010). For these reasons, I hypothesize that firms competing in 
differentiated industries are more likely to have a CMO on the TMT: 
H3: Firm industry orientation (differentiation) is positively related to firm 
adoption of a TMT that includes a CMO. 
 
 
Industry Orientation, Market Power, and CMO Presence on TMTs 
In addition to a direct effect, industry orientation (i.e., differentiation) may also 
affect the firm’s decision of whether the TMT structure should include a CMO through 
moderation of a firm’s market power. Findings in previous research suggest at least three 
reasons to believe so. First, differentiated industries provide the firm a broader range of 
competitive actions (Porter, 1980) than market power alone. Second, a host of 
endogenous and exogenous variables may influence the ability of firms within 
differentiated industries to generate market power. Examples of these variables include 
profit margin, market size, frequency of purchase, buyer knowledge ability, number of 
brands, barriers to entry, and the manner in which goods are sold (Andras & Srinivasan, 
2003; Farris & Albion, 1981; Porter, 1980). Third, as the degree of differentiation 
increases and innovation spreads, powerful forces emerge in the form of isomorphism 
that cause firms to become more similar in their output and structure (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983).  
 Furthermore, previous research suggests that differentiated industries provide an 





industries with greater competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990) and when industry 
instability increases (Pasa & Shugan, 1996), such as in highly differentiated industries. 
For example, Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) find that the marketing function provides a 
greater contribution to firm outcomes in the differentiated food processing industry than 
in the commoditized plastics industry. Fornell and Johnson (1993) empirically find that 
differentiated industries rate systematically higher in perceived product performance and 
subsequent consumer satisfaction. Product performance and consumer satisfaction are 
antecedents of a firm’s ability to earn higher-than-normal profit margins, thereby creating 
market power (Fornell, Mithas, Morgeson, & Krishnan, 2006; Reichheld & Sasser, 
1990). Within the differentiated soft-drink industry, Cotterill et al. (1996) conclude that 
market power is largely due to product differentiation, a primary domain of marketing, 
and the CMO position (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Moreover, industries with high product 
differentiability also provide greater managerial discretion and value experimentation and 
are a proving ground for new strategies (Datta et al., 2002). Of note, Nath and Mahajan 
(2008) find that a differentiation strategy at the firm level is also related to the likelihood 
of a CMO presence on the TMT.  
Prior research also suggests that in differentiated industries, TMTs include a 
CMO to (1) increase legitimacy (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), (2) attract greater and 
higher-quality resources (Baum & Oliver, 1991; Heugens & Lander, 2009), and (3) 
increase the likelihood that the firm will select the primary differentiating attribute that 
most buyers in the industry perceive as important and unique, which in turn will garner 
the firm above-average profits (Porter, 1985), further enhancing market power.  





H4: The positive relationship between firm market power and presence of a CMO 
on the TMT is moderated by industry orientation such that within highly 
differentiated industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in lower 





 This paper uses hierarchical logistic regression to examine both continuous 
environmental variables that predict the presence of a CMO on the TMT. The time frame 
selected for this sample is calendar year 2010 and 2011. In selecting these two full year 
periods, I avoid observed noise and financial turmoil associated with issues arising from 
the 2007–2009 economic crises while providing a current reflection of the TMT structure 
among U.S. firms.  
 
Data Sources  
 The data for Hypothesis H1, H2, H3 and H4 was drawn from the secondary data 
source Capital IQ, in accordance with prior research examining TMT and environmental 
conditions (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 1990; Vergne, 2011). 
Additional data was obtained from annual reports, 10K reports, and other public sources, 
including Morningstar.com. This data included TMT size in accordance with prior 
research (Nath & Mahajan, 2008) and verification of the presence or absence of a CMO 





The use of secondary data, public databases, and business press to acquire 
information on publicly traded firms is consistent with prior TMT and organizational 
literature (e.g., Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Boyd et al., 2010; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 2008; 
Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Pearce & Zahra, 1992; Reichert, Lockett, & Rao, 1996; Sullivan, 
Haunschild, & Page, 2007). Consistent with other studies using similar data sources 
(McGahan & Porter, 1997), this analysis excludes private firms because the data 
necessary to conduct the analysis as modeled, such as advertising investment or sales 
revenue, is not in the public domain.   
 
Sample and Sample Size 
 The data set consists of a random sample of firms with and without a titled CMO 
present on the TMT from among 11,017 public U.S. firms one year or older. This sample 
includes firms across 10 different industry groups from the Capital IQ database, using 
two-digit Global Industry Classification System (GICS) codes, developed jointly by 
Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley’s Capital International. Bhojraj, Lee, and Oler 
(2003) suggest that GICS is significantly better than the other three classification 
schemes at explaining cross-sectional variations, forecasted and realized growth rates, 
R&D expenditures, and other key financial ratios across large-cap, mid-cap, and small-
cap firms. Thus, GICS is employed for this examination because it is more homogeneous 
than older Standard Industrial Classification codes, the North America Import Database, 
and the Fama–French classification system (Fama & French, 1997). Furthermore, prior 





power, and have a greater correlation across industry peer firms than the Fama–French 
algorithm (Chan, Lakonishok, & Swaminathan, 2007). 
However, unlike prior research that limits sample size to firms reporting total 
sales revenue of at least $250 million (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Nath & Mahajan, 
2008), my sample was drawn from all publicly traded U.S. firms, regardless of sales 
volume, and provided all necessary data points so as not to constrain the data set 
artificially or ignore the presence of CMOs in smaller or newly established firms.  
In accordance with Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010), a random sub-set of 
firms were created to both ensure that the primary data set is representative of the 
population and provide a manner for validating the logistic models tested. For example, 
the mean natural log of firm age for the population of U.S. public companies between 
2010 and 2011 was 1.43 compared to a mean of 1.48 for the analysis sample data set and 
for the validating sample set. 
Because the nature of analysis for H1, H2, H3, and H4 is logistic regression, a 
larger sample size was required (Hair et al., 2010). Thus, 1,218 observations were 
obtained.
 
Twenty seven observations with missing data were discarded, including all 5 
observations in the Utilities industry. The Schweinle method was then used to identify 
outliers (2.5 standard deviations from mean), 44 were discarded, resulting in a total 
sample size of 1,147.
1
  
 A random sample of approximately 50% of the observations containing a CMO 
was combined with a random sample of 50% of the observations without a CMO, 
                                                     
1 The composition of the analysis sample by industry using two-digit GICS codes was 10 firms in 
Energy (GICS 10), 31 in Materials (GICS 15), 84 in Industrials (GICS 20), 138 in Consumer  
Discretionary (GICS 25), 32 in Consumer Staples (GICS 30), 115 in Health Care (GIC35), 18 in 
Financials (GICS 40), 139 in Information Technology (GICS 45), and 5 in Telecommunication 





resulting in 572 observations designated as the analysis sample. The remaining 575 
observations were designated as the validation sample in accordance with Hair et al. 
(2010) to establish external validity, assess the predictive accuracy, and provide insight 
into generalizability of the logistic model. In line with prior research, each sample 
exceeds the recommended size for logistic regression analysis (greater than 400) (Hosmer 
& Lemeshow, 2000) and the minimum size (375) necessary to be representative of the 
total population of U.S. firms (Krejcie & Morgan, 1970). 
The analysis sample contained 131 observations with a CMO present comprising 
22.9% of the sample, while the validation sample contained 130 observations with a 
CMO present, or 22.6% of the total sample. These proportions were directionally similar 
to reported findings by Nash and Mahajan (2008) of 19.6% for firms that had a titled 
CMO on the TMT.   
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable of interest is the presence or absence of a CMO on the 
TMT. In keeping with prior research (e.g., Boyd et al., 2010), this condition was 
identified through use of titled positions that expressly stated “chief marketing officer.” 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest that researchers can identify members of the TMT 
simply by equating executive titles with membership in the TMT. For the purpose of this 









 The predictor variables examined were firm visibility (FV), market power (MP), 
and industry orientation (IO). In addition, one moderating variable was created to test the 
moderating influence of industry orientation on the relationship between market power 
and CMO presence on the TMT. 
 
Firm Visibility  
In line with prior research (Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999; 
Barron, Byard, Kile, & Riedl, 2002), the construct of firm visibility (FV) used two 
measures: the number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the number of 
institutional shareholders (NOS). Baker et al. (1999) define firm visibility as the extent, 
to which analysts follow, and institutions hold, a firm’s stock. Ackert and Athanassakos 
(2001) suggest that these measures are relevant and widely accepted proxies for firm 
visibility. Thus, in line with prior research (Baker et al., 1999), the construct of firm 
visibility was measured as the number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the 
number of institutional shareholders (NOS) at the close of each year observed. Because 
H1 examines a theoretical construct composed of multiple inputs of different numeric 
ranges, the geometric mean was calculated to reflect firm visibility. 
 
Market Power  
The construct of firm market power (MP) was examined by combining two 
measures: advertising intensity (AI) and R&D intensity (RI). Advertising intensity (AI) 





industry median advertising expenses (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). McAlister, Srinivasan, 
and Kim (2007) find that advertising intensity affects the systematic risk and return of the 
firm.  
Research intensity (RI) was measured by annual R&D expenses divided by 
annual sales less industry median R&D expenses (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Prior studies 
examining (RI) have found that R&D expenditures affect systematic risk of the firm and 
analyst recommendations (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001; McAlister et al., 2007). 
Andras and Srinivasan (2003) suggest that advertising intensity is greater in consumer 
product firms but research intensity (RI) is greater in manufacturing product firms; they 
also find that both (AI) and (RI) are positively related to firms’ profit margins (Krishnan, 
Tadepalli, & Park, 2009). Thus, in line with prior research (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; 
Krishnan, Tadepalli, & Park, 2009), the construct of market power was measured as the 
combination of a firm’s (AI) and (RI) for each year observed because both have been 
found to contribute to a firm’s market power. Because H2 examines a theoretical 
construct composed of multiple inputs of different numeric ranges, the geometric mean 
was calculated to reflect firm market power. 
 
Industry Orientation    
Finally, industry orientation was examined by measuring the degree of 
differentiation within each industry. Differentiated industries typically provide a wide 
variety of products or services that meet the needs and desires of heterogeneous 
customers (Grönroos, 1983). Conversely, lesser differentiated industries refer to 





for one another (Bannock & Baxter, 2011). Industries with higher advertising intensity 
are deemed to be highly differentiated while those with lower advertising intensity are 
characterized as having low differentiation. Firm membership was ascertained by means 
of the six-digit industry code representing each firm’s dominant line of business, as 
classified by GICS. Consistent with Hull & Rothenberg (2008), industry orientation was 
measured using the average advertising intensity in each firm’s industry for the period 
examined. Thus, industry orientation as reflected by the degree of differentiation was 
measured by the geometric mean of two years of advertising intensity by industry then 
standardized using Z-score transformation to reflect the degree of differentiation among 
industries within the sample. 
 
Control Variables 
In accordance with prior research (Collins & Clark, 2003; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; 
Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Nath & Mahajan, 2008), five control variables were used: 
firm size, firm age, TMT size, whether a CEO was an outsider or an insider before 
appointment to the position, and industry membership. Firm size was included as a 
control variable because it addresses the likelihood that large firms enjoy more resource 
advantages than small firms (Collins & Clark, 2003), which may influence both human 
resource policies and firm performance (Jackson & Schuler, 1995). The construct of firm 
size is widely represented in extant research, which has operationalized it using several 
quantitative methods, including total sales (Ciscell & Carroll, 1980; Murphy, 1985) and 
book value of net assets (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Prasad, 1974; Rajagopalan & Prescott, 





employees (Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Murphy, 1985). In line with previous research (Boyd 
et al., 2010; Covin, Green, & Slevin, 2006; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Newbert, 2007), I 
measured firm size as the total number of firm employees.  
 Prior research has also found that firm age influences a firm’s capabilities (e.g., 
Autio, Sapienza & Almeida, 2000; Finkle, 1998; Park, Mezias, & Song, 2004), so it was 
included as a control variable. Controlling for firm age can also help address differences 
in ownership structure (Eisenberg, Sundgren, & Wells, 1998) and firm growth rates 
(Delmar, Davidsson, & Gartner, 2003; Loderer & Waelchli, 2010). Firm age was 
measured by the number of years a firm has been in business (Ensley & Hmieleski, 
2005).  
 Top management team size has been operationalized by prior researchers in many 
ways, as observed by Carpenter, Geletkanyez, and Sanders (2004). It typically reflects the 
top two tiers of the organization’s management—that is, CEO, chairman, COO, and chief 
financial officer and the next-highest management tier (Carpenter, 2002; Finkelstein & 
Hambrick, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1992). TMT size helps determine the nature of a 
TMT’s information-processing and decision-making capabilities (Haleblian & 
Finkelstein, 1993) and pertains to the complexity TMT executives encounter (Henderson 
& Fredrickson, 1996). Following prior research (Nath & Mahajan, 2008), TMT size was 
defined as the number of executive officers specified by a firm in the 10-K or proxy, its 
annual mandatory filings with the Securities Exchange Commission. The mean size of 
the TMT in the analysis sample was 9.37, and the standard deviation was 2.7, which was 
consistent with prior research findings (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Controlling for TMT 





research to examine the effects of the TMT on firm outcomes by controlling for team 
size. Failure to control for TMT size may confound results, making it difficult to discern 
whether the results should be attributed to heterogeneity or team size (Carpenter & 
Fredrickson, 2001; Carpenter et al., 2004).  
 Whether a CEO was an outsider or an insider before appointment was also 
included as a control variable because this factor has been associated with the likelihood 
of CMO presence in the TMT (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). Firm-specific operational 
experience has helped explain other TMT staffing decisions. For example, Hambrick and 
Cannella (2004) find that CEOs who lack firm-specific experience are more likely to 
have a COO than insider CEOs. Therefore, in accordance with prior research, a dummy 
variable was created and coded as 1 if the CEO had firm tenure longer than a year and 0 
if the CEO had spent less than one year with the firm before appointment to CEO.  
Finally, prior research (Lees, 1997; Meyer & Rowan, 1977) contends controlling 
for industry membership is necessary to capture the effects of industry-level variables on 
organizational structure such as whether or not a CMO is present on the TMT. For this 
reason, my study included industry dummy variables, coded as 1 for industry 
membership and 0 for non-membership. Industry membership was ascertained by means 
of the two-digit industry code as classified by GICS. Industries represented in the sample 
include: Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, 
Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, and Telecommunication Services. 
However, the Energy and Telecommunications industries were excluded as control 
variables because there were 10 or fewer observations in both the validation and analysis 






Because H1, H2, H3, and H4 examine the relationship between the explanatory 
variables and a qualitative dependent variable to determine the likelihood of CMO 
presence on the TMT, hierarchical logistic regression was used. Logistic regression 
assumes a categorical dependent variable with a binomial distribution. Prior research has 
deemed this manner of analysis appropriate (Hair et al., 2010; Matta & Beamish, 2008; 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Before the hierarchical logistic regression was conducted, bivariate correlations 
were examined in the analysis sample. Except for the correlation between the control 
variable TMT size and the independent variable firm visibility (r = .510), no other 
bivariate correlations approached the .70 threshold when collinearity begins to distort 
model estimation (Dorman et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2010). A similar correlation (r = .525) 
was observed between the same variables in the validation sample. However, the analysis 
sample and the validation sample each exceeded 250 observations; Mason and Perreault 
(1991) suggest bivariate correlations greater than .70 have minimal effect on the ability of 
a model to draw correct inferences. Variance inflation factor (VIF) scores for both the 
analysis sample and the validation sample were then compared with the suggested cutoff 
threshold of 10 (Hair et al., 2010; Tull & Hawkins, 1990; Lehmann, Gupta, & Steckel, 
1988). The independent variables were examined for multicollinearity; no variable had a 
standard error larger than 1.0, and no variable was found to have a VIF score above 3, 
well below the suggested cutoff value of 10 (Hair et al., 2010). Because logistic 
regression was employed, heteroskedasticity was not a concern (Hair et al., 2010). 
Table 2 reflects the hierarchical logistic regression results from the analysis 
sample. Model 1A contains the test results from the control variables on CMO 
presence/absence. Model 1B contains the results from the independent variables firm 
visibility, market power, and industry orientation (Model 1B) on CMO presence/absence. 
Model 1C contains the results of the hypothesized moderating relationship of industry 
orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO presence/absence. 
Variables used in the creation of the interaction terms were centered before analysis 







As Table 2 shows, the first part in the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1A) 
included only the control variables. Goodness-of-fit as measured by -2 log likelihood for 
Model 1A was 499.648. Among the control variables, firm size (β = .000, p = .005), TMT 
size (β = .238, p = .000), the industry dummy variable for materials (β = 2.027, p = .015), 
industrials (β = 1.974, p = .002), and healthcare (β = 2.595, p = .000) were found to be 
significant using a one-tailed test. Model 1A, including the constant and the control 
Table 2
Predicting CMO Presence on TMTs 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
β eβ β eβ β eβ
Step 1: Constant      -12.094*** (3.385)     -10.087** (3.742)    -10.208** (3.758)
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size         .000** (.000)      .000 (.000)      .000 (.000)
Firm Age     -.003 (.003)     -.005 (.004)    -.005 (.004)
TMT Size           .238*** (.046)      .073 (.050)      .070 (.051)
CEO Appointment History    -.154 (.253)    -.415 (.280)    -.422 (.280)
Industry Dummy - Materials     2.027* (.830)    1.707 (.882)     1.745* (.881)
Industry Dummy - Industrials       1.974** (.634)       2.299** (.705)       2.350** (.710)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary     .769 (.565)      .541 (.626)      .618 (.626)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples     .633 (.684)      .467 (.783)      .394 (.794)
Industry Dummy - Healthcare         2.595*** (.679)         2.734*** (.743)         2.797*** (.749)
Industry Dummy - Finance   1.223 (.777)     .850 (.856)     .841 (.854)
Industry Dummy - IT     .427 (.557)     .372 (.616)     .428 (.617)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility          2.175*** (.321)          2.175*** (.322)
Market Power          1.503** (.529)          1.290* (.547)
Industry Orientation            .080 (.109)            .057 (.119)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power      .748 (.485)
Chi square        115.928     188.330      190.953
Negelkerke R Square              .278           .426            .431
Percent correctly classified          79.4%      81.8%        81.6%
n = 572
77.1% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  one-tailed test





variables, had a classification accuracy rate of 79.4% of the cases and Nagelkerke 
pseudo-R-square of .278.  
The second part of the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1B) measured the 
direct effects of the independent variables. The addition of firm visibility, market power, 
and industry orientation to the model resulted in a significant change in the classification 
accuracy from 79.4% to 81.8% compared to Model 1A, reflecting the enhanced 
predictability of Model 1B compared to Model 1A. Goodness-of-fit as measured by -2 
log likelihood for Model 1B was 427.245, a lower value than Model 1A, representing a 
better model fit (Hair et al., 2010). Regarding the direct effect of the independent 
variables on CMO presence/absence on the TMT, firm visibility was positive and 
statistically significant (β = 2.175, p = .000), market power was positive and statistically 
significant (β = 1.503, p = .004), while industry orientation was positive but not 
statistically significant (β = .080, p = .466). Model 1B had a Nagelkerke pseudo-R-square 
of 0.426. The increase of the value of Nagelkerke pseudo-R-square closer to 1.0 also 
indicates Model 1B is a better fit than Model 1A (Hair et al., 2010).   
The third part of the hierarchical logistic regression (Model 1C) measured the 
interaction effect of industry orientation on market power and CMO presence/absence on 
the TMT. The addition of the moderating variable represented no meaningful 
improvement in model fit as measured by -2 log likelihood (424.623) or classification 
accuracy (81.6%) over the main effects Model 1B. Model 1C had a Nagelkerke pseudo-
R-square of 0.431. The interaction was positive but non-significant (β = .748, p = .123). 
Thus, the addition of the moderating variable industry orientation on the relationship 





The logistic regression coefficients reported in Model 1B show that firm visibility 
was positive and significant (β = 2.175, p <.001). Thus, the findings support H1: Firm 
visibility is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. 
For H2, the logistic regression coefficients show that market power was positive and 
significant (β = 1.503, p < .010). Thus, this finding supports H2: Firm market power is 
positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. For H3, the 
logistic regression coefficients show that industry orientation was positive but non-
significant (β = .080, p > .050). Thus, this finding does not support H3: Firm industry 
orientation (differentiation) is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT that includes 
a CMO. 
The logistic regression coefficients reported in Model 1C were non-significant (β 
= .748, p >.050). Thus, H4, which predicted: The positive relationship between firm 
market power and presence of a CMO on the TMT is moderated by industry orientation 
such that within differentiated industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in non-























Figure 2 indicates the interaction effect between industry orientation and market 
power on CMO presence on the TMT. The coefficient for this interaction term is non-
significant (p > .050). However, the interaction charted suggests that in situations where 
market power is high and industry orientation is highly differentiated, industry orientation 
amplifies the relationship between market power and CMO presence, but when industry 
orientation is undifferentiated, it does not.   
While prior literature has not offered specific rules that are applicable to reporting 
logistic regression (Peng, Lee, & Ingersoll, 2002), reporting validation results is an 
important test of internal validity (Bagley, White, & Golomb, 2001). Thus, the results 
from analysis of the validation sample are provided in Appendix 1. As reported, the 






Finally, my study operationalized CMO presence on the TMT (someone expressly 
holding the title of Chief Marketing Officer) differently than Nath and Mahajan (2008).
2
 
As such, additional analysis was conducted on both the analysis and validation sample to 
examine each hypothesis using the broader definition of a CMO. Using this broader 
definition and the analysis sample, I found that the classification accuracy of Model 1A 
was 68.2%, Model 1B was 70.1%, and Model 1C was 69.9%. Of the variables of interest, 
I found only firm visibility to be positive and significant, (β = .557, p = .001). Firm 
market power was positive but non-significant (β = .337, p = .316) while industry 
orientation was negative and non-significant (β = -.121, p = .238). The moderating 
variable industry orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO 
presence was negative and non-significant (β = -070, p = .844). Analysis of the validation 
sample using the broader definition of a CMO also confirmed findings from the analysis 
sample. Firm visibility was positive and significant (β = .599, p = .000), market power 
was positive but non-significant (β = .281, p = .476), and industry orientation was 
negative and non-significant (β = -.043, p = .700). The moderating variable industry 
orientation on the relationship between market power and CMO presence was negative 
and non-significant (β = -.020, p = .965). As a result, only hypothesis H1 was supported 
using the broader definition of a CMO. Findings from the analysis sample and the 
validation sample using the broader definition of a CMO are reported in Appendixes 2 
and 3, respectively. 
 
                                                     
2 Nath and Mahajan (2008) operationalize CMO presence as any executive on the TMT 
with the term “marketing” in his or her title. In addition to chief marketing officer, titles 
included vice president marketing, senior vice president marketing, or executive vice 






 This study began in an attempt to explain why some firms have a CMO on the 
TMT while others do not. Prior research (Nath & Mahajon, 2008) has identified several 
internal factors that predict CMO presence; however, little to no empirical evidence 
existed examining the firm’s external environment. As suggested by scholarly literature 
(Cyert & March, 1963; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983), the application of institutional theory 
is deemed to be appropriate in both examining the external environment of the firm as 
well as predicting managerial structures of the firm, such as the presence of a CMO in the 
TMT.  
 Thus, this study leverages the explanatory power of institutional theory in 
theorizing that structural isomorphism is a significant determinant of the adoption of 
managerial structures that include a CMO on the TMT when firms seek to obtain, 
maintain, or increase firm legitimacy. Specifically, this study examines three 
environmental constructs under which a CMO may be more likely to be present in the 
TMT of a firm: firm visibility, firm market power, and industry orientation (i.e., 
differentiation). 
 The study hypothesized (H1) that firm visibility was positively related to firm 
adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. It hypothesized (H2) that firm market 
power is positively related to firm adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. It 
hypothesized (H3) that industry orientation (differentiation) was positively related to firm 
adoption of a TMT structure that includes a CMO. Finally, the study hypothesized (H4) 
that the relationship between firm market power and the presence of a CMO on the TMT 





industries the positive relationship is stronger, but in non-differentiated industries, the 
relationship is weaker. The lack of significance of this finding may have occurred 
because a threshold had been reached beyond which mimetic behavior failed to provide 
the firm incremental benefits, such as legitimacy or firm performance (Meyer & Rowan, 
1977). 
 This study found that a CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT of firms 
that have greater firm visibility, thus hypothesis 1 was supported. This study also found 
that a CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT when firms have greater market 
power; thus, hypothesis 2 was supported. However, this study found no support that a 
CMO was more likely to be present on the TMT when firms operated in differentiated 
industries or when firms with high market power operated in differentiated industries. 
Thus, hypotheses 3 and 4 were not supported. 
 
Contributions 
The contribution of this study is that it extends the scope of scholarly inquiry, 
from a marketing and management perspective, to provide significant new insights as to 
the conditions under which a CMO is most likely to be present on a firm’s TMT. In doing 
so, I was able to identify two previously unexamined conditions—firm visibility and 
market power—that individually and collectively help predict and explain why some 
TMTs have a CMO presence while others do not. Furthermore, by comparing TMTs 
containing different marketing titles, I have demonstrated that there may be important 






This finding suggests that future research examining the role and influence of a CMO 
should examine both broad and narrow definitions of a CMO.  
 
Managerial Implications 
From this examination, three implications for managers arise. Foremost, managers 
must recognize that the external environment of a firm can play an influential role in 
shaping the managerial structure of a firm. Firm visibility and firm market power are just 
two factors managers should consider. Secondly, managers should recognize that the 
inclusion of a CMO on the TMT provides another way for the firm to meet the on-going 
demand for firm-level information by capitol market actors. Third, these findings 
empirically support prior research that suggested strategic and tactical deployment of a 
firm’s valuable resources, such as market power, not only come under the marketing 
function (Hyde, Landry, & Tipping, 2004) but are best leveraged by “corporate-level 
distinctive competencies” (Hitt & Ireland, 1985, p. 289). Thus, the presence of a CMO on 
the TMT provides unique functional support to the TMT that leads to empowerment of 
the firm to better address market-related complexity. 
  
Limitations 
 One of the primary limitations of this study was the limited presence of a CMO 
across all industries equally. Another limiting factor was that many firms did not publicly 
report all measures necessary to conduct this analysis. As a result, I omitted firms that did 
not fully report key metrics such as those that did not report at least one measure for 





constrained by the total number of firms within the industry reporting advertising 
investment. By virtue of the variables studied, such as the number of shares outstanding, 
the sample was limited to publicly traded firms. The data set was also limited to U.S. 
firms and observations taken within a two year period. Overcoming the limitations of this 
study such as conducting similar research in other countries or surveying similar 
measures from private firms could prove beneficial in extending the generalizability of 
this model.   
 
Future Research 
The findings of this study lead to additional questions for future research. 
Foremost, what other environmental factors besides firm visibility and market power 
might influence CMO presence on the TMT? Market complexity might be one such 
factor to be examined. Does the managerial structure of international firms mirror that of 
U.S. firms when faced with similar environmental pressure? Another area that warrants 
further examination is the perceived and operational differences between a CMO and 
other senior marketing titles such as Vice President of Marketing. The outcome of this 
study suggests differences do exist between a titled CMO and someone with “marketing” 
in their title on the TMT. Understanding these differences could further aid firms in 
decisions about TMT structure. Last, would a different theory, such as contingency or 
signaling theory, suggest other factors that might influence the presence or absence of a 








Institutional theory applied in a marketing context provides a solid framework 
upon which to examine environmental factors that may influence managerial structure 
and behavior such as the adoption of a CMO on the TMT. Firm visibility and market 
power are two such factors that help predict and explain the presence of a CMO on the 
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Appendix 1 - Validation Sample 
Predicting CMO Presence on TMTs 
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
β eβ β eβ β eβ
Step 1: Constant   -3.343 (3.341)     -2.040 (3.659)      -1.914 (3.673)
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size         .000** (.000)       .000 (.000)         .000 (.000)
Firm Age     -.003 (.003)     -.004 (.004)       -.004 (.004)
TMT Size           .190*** (.047)       .044 (.054)         .045 (.055)
CEO Appointment History    -.393 (.255)      -.293 (.269)       -.283 (.269)
Industry Dummy - Materials     .716 (.811)       .863 (.894)        .813 (.892)
Industry Dummy - Industrials     .790 (.661)       .743 (.714)        .707 (.717)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary     -.703 (.554)     -.931 (.604)       -.945 (.606)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples     -.654 (.707)     -.710 (.786)       -.688 (.791)
Industry Dummy - Healthcare       1.541* (.694)       1.835* (.749)         1.831* (.750)
Industry Dummy - Finance    -.666 (.808)      -.975 (.884)      -1.031 (.888)
Industry Dummy - IT    -.953 (.560)      -.876 (.615)       -.894 (.618)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility           1.662*** (.270)            1.673*** (.270)
Market Power           1.228* (.597)            1.195* (.597)
Industry Orientation             .094 (.130)              .106 (.137)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power        .497 (.568)
Chi square      124.411       181.355       182.102
Negelkerke R Square            .296             .411             .412
Percent correctly classified        82.1%         83.0%         83.0%
n = 575
77.2% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  one-tailed test



















Appendix 2 - Analysis Sample
Predicting CMO Presence on TMT Defined as Any Marketing Title on TMT
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
β eβ β eβ β eβ
Step 1: Constant      -9.839** (3.734)        -8.321** (3.779)         -8.311** (3.779)
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size         .000** (.000)        .000 (.000)        .000 (.000)
Firm Age      -.007* (.003)         -.008* (.003)        -.008* (.003)
TMT Size           .193*** (.041)           .145** (.044)            .145** (.044)
CEO Appointment History    -.273 (.209)       -.265 (.214)       -.265 (.214)
Industry Dummy - Materials       2.647** (.795)          2.595** (.804)          2.593** (.804)
Industry Dummy - Industrials   1.079 (.647)        .978 (.651)        .975 (.652)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary     .885 (.632)        .722 (.641)        .716 (.641)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples     .216 (.744)      -.162 (.772)      -.150 (.774)
Industry Dummy - Healthcare      2.048** (.646)          1.947** (.650)          1.939** (.652)
Industry Dummy - Finance    1.900* (.769)        1.626* (.781)        1.622* (.781)
Industry Dummy - IT     .406 (.628)       .359 (.633)       .355 (.634)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility             .557** (.166)              .557** (.166)
Market Power             .337 (.336)              .346 (.340)
Industry Orientation            -.121 (.103)             -.122 (.102)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power      -.070 (.356)
Chi square     130.098      143.709       143.748
Negelkerke R Square            .271             .296             .296
Percent correctly classified       68.2%        70.1%         69.9%
n = 572
50.0% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  one-tailed test







Appendix 3 - Validation Sample
Predicting CMO Presence on TMT Defined as Any Marketing Title on TMT
Hierarchical Logistic Regression Analysis
Variables
β eβ β eβ β eβ
Step 1: Constant    .778 (2.803) -1.707 (2.910)     -1.705 (2.842)
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size      .000* (.000)    .000 (.000)        .000 (.000)
Firm Age   -.005 (.003)   -.005 (.003)       -.005 (.003)
TMT Size          .188*** (.043)        .121** (.046)            .121** (.046)
CEO Appointment History    .002 (.205)     .055 (.211)        .054 (.211)
Industry Dummy - Materials     .908 (.664)     .998 (.678)        .999 (.678)
Industry Dummy - Industrials   -.064 (.507)   -.054 (.515)        -.054 (.515)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Discretionary    -1.007* (.474)   -1.062* (.479)       -1.062* (.479)
Industry Dummy - Consumer Staples    -1.338* (.640)   -1.496* (.668)       -1.496* (.668)
Industry Dummy - Healthcare       .291* (.487)    .371 (.494)        .370 (.494)
Industry Dummy - Finance    -.539 (.725)  -.833 (.759)       -.831 (.760)
Industry Dummy - IT    -1.485** (.481)    -1.435** (.490)         -1.435** (.490)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility           .599*** (.154)              .599*** (.154)
Market Power           .281 (.394)              .280 (.394)
Industry Orientation         -.043 (.112)             -.043 (.112)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
Industry Orientation X Firm Market Power       -.020 (.444)
Chi square     121.361    137.804       137.806
Negelkerke R Square            .254           .285             .285
Percent correctly classified       68.3%      71.5%        71.5%
n = 575
53.9% Predicted percentage classification without model inputs.
Primary sample reported.
CMO Presence: 1=Present, 0=Absent.
CEO Appointment History: 1=Insider, -1=Outsider
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  one-tailed test











THE MODERATING INFLUENCE OF CMO PRESENCE ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN FIRM VISIBILITY, MARKET POWER, AND INDUSTRY 





 Over time, firms that match their top management team (TMT) structure to their 
environmental context are more financially successful (Keck, 1997). Michel and 
Hambrick (1992) suggest that marketing expertise on the TMT is critical to creation of 
shareholder value. The appointment of a chief marketing officer (CMO) to the TMT is 
one such way firms have attempted to address the needs of their environment to enhance 
firm performance. Yet, an overarching limitation in the research literature stream 
examining the importance of a CMO on the TMT is the scarcity of empirical research on 
the value relevance of the presence of a CMO on firm performance. Addressing this gap 
is important because of the long-standing debate on the financial relevance of the 
marketing function (Frazier, 2007; Kerin, 2005; McGovern, Court, Quelch, & Crawford, 
2004; Moorman & Rust, 1999; Webster, Malter, & Ganesan, 2003; Zinkhan & 
Verbrugge, 2000). This is particularly true when the marketing function is represented on 





Mahajan, 2008, 2011; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Weinzimmer, 
Bond, Houston, & Nystrom, 2003).   
The decision to include a CMO on the TMT is complex (Nath & Mahajan, 2008). 
This study provides insight into why prior empirical studies attempting to link the 
presence of a CMO to firm performance have yielded mixed results. In doing so, this 
study examines the moderating role of CMO presence on the relationship between firm 
performance and firm visibility (H1), market power (H2), and industry orientation (H3) 
through the lens of signaling theory.  
Most prior research examining the relationship between a CMO’s presence on the 
TMT and firm performance has adopted an intra-firm perspective examining the CMO’s 
impact on internal firm processes. For example, Weinzimmer et al. (2003) suggest that 
the inclusion of functional marketing expertise in the TMT, such as the CMO’s 
capabilities, contributes to sales growth, firm profitability, and shareholder value. Boyd et 
al., (2010) examine CMO managerial discretion in the firm. Nath and Mahajan (2008) 
examine the relationship between CMO presence and firm-level innovation, 
differentiation, branding strategy, and diversification. Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) 
examine the relationship between CMO presence and strategic behavior among family-
named firms. Nath and Mahajan (2011) examine CMO power in the TMT and domains 
of control in the firm.  
Two studies (i.e., Boyd et al. 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009) have examined the 
impact of CMO appointment/announcement on firm performance, with 
contextual/contingent results surrounding favorable changes in firm performance, using 





the authors focus on the conditions that help explain variation in the shareholder reaction, 
specifically firm-level conditions, such as managerial control, internal versus external 
appointment, and individual-level characteristics (i.e., prior executive-level experience). 
The authors suggest that the appointment or announcement itself does not improve firm 
value but rather that the context of those appointments strongly influence perceived firm 
performance. More specifically, Boyd et al. (2010) identify individual and firm-specific 
conditions in which the CMO contributed more or less to firm performance. Similarly, 
Abernathy et al. (2013) use performance attribution analysis to measure stock valuation 
of firms with and without a CMO. They also found that enhanced firm value was 
contextual.  
Regardless of the approach, the relationship between a CMO’s presence on the 
TMT and firm performance has yielded mixed results. For example, Boyd et al. (2010) 
find only moderated effects on firm performance when examining the shareholder effect 
of a CMO appointment using abnormal stock price movement of the appointing firm. 
Nath and Mahajan (2011) report no direct effect of CMO presence on firm performance 
but suggest conditional effects when CMO power is greater and when CMO 
responsibility includes the firm’s sales function. Nath and Mahajan (2008) suggest no 
direct effect when measuring CMO presence and firm performance. Kashmiri and 
Mahajan (2010) also report no direct effect of CMO presence in their examination of firm 
performance among family-named firms. Vafeas and Vlittis (2009) suggest that though 
the market, on average, does not interpret the appointment of a CMO as a signal of 
improving firm value, certain conditions surrounding their CMO appointment do. For 





value. Conversely, Abernathy et al., (2013) suggest there is a direct effect between CMO 
presence and firm performance making the presence of a CMO on the TMT 
“economically relevant.” They report that a portfolio of stocks with a CMO present yields 
a greater annualized return (approximately 3%) compared to a stock portfolio of firms 
without a CMO present on the TMT after adjusting for risk. In addition, they also suggest 
that the effect of a CMO on the TMT is contextual upon firm strategic positioning, 
profitability, innovation, and magnitude of advertising investment. Thus, unlike prior 
research examining the direct relationship between CMO presence and firm performance, 
the main contribution of this study is the examination of the moderating effect of CMO 
presence on firm performance. Examining the moderating effect is important because 
inconsistent findings from prior research could be due to a focus on CMO presence as a 
direct effect rather than on how CMO presence moderates other relationships. 
In this study, I use signaling theory to examine the signaling power of CMO 
presence on firm performance. Signaling theory describes the process decision makers, 
such as shareholders, use to resolve information asymmetry in competitive environments 
(Spence, 1973, 1974). Firms intentionally convey information, often about intangible 
qualities or important non-financial information, to external stakeholders to influence 
their perceptions (Jones & Murrell, 2001) and manage stakeholder relationships 
(Clarkson, 1995; Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011; Freeman, 1984). 
Appointment of a CMO has been viewed as a signal of increased emphasis on market 
orientation, and potential improvements in business profitability (Kumar & Petersen, 





Using signaling theory, I theoretically and empirically examine the moderating 
influence of the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on three firm-level factors—
firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation (differentiation)—known 
to influence firm performance (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Chung & Jo, 1996; Farris & 
Buzzell, 1979; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Kotabe, 1990; Mansfield, 1981; McGahan & 
Porter, 1997). Thus, the contribution of my study expands the scope of inquiry to 
examine moderating relationships that no other CMO study has specifically or 
empirically explored. Furthermore, by examining the signaling power of CMO presence 
among stakeholders in a non-event context, my study introduces alternative ways CMO 
presence may contribute to firm performance, thus potentially making unique 
contributions to the academic and practitioner dialogue on the role of a CMO on the TMT 
as well as the manner in which firms can enhance firm performance. 
In addition, the design of my study explores the operational definition differences 
of a CMO used by Nath and Mahajan (2008) and Abernathy et al., (2013) and expands 
the scope of inquiry. Namely, my study narrowly defines the variable of interest “CMO 
presence” (i.e., someone who expressly holds the CMO title vs. anyone with the term 
“marketing” in their title). In addition, my study uses a much broader sample, both in 
breadth of industries and size/number of firms, not subject to the constraints of previous 
research that allows for a better perspective of the impact of a CMO on the TMT and 
their relationship to firm performance. Furthermore, instead of employing accounting-
based measures or event-based changes in stock value to measure firm performance, I use 
Tobin’s Q to measure firm performance because it is a market-based measure of firm 





Literature Review and Research Hypotheses 
 
Signaling Theory 
Prior research suggests that perceptions of firm quality can be enhanced through 
symbolic sources of information (Sanders & Boivie, 2004). Therefore, firms knowingly 
use symbols (Rao, 1994) and attributes to signal firm quality (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Sanders & Boivie, 2004). A signal can convey a socially constructed meaning beyond its 
intrinsic content or obvious functional use (Morgan, Frost, & Pondy, 1983).  
The act of using symbols and/or adopting formal structures, such as TMT 
composition (Certo & Hodge, 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007), conveys a signal to the 
marketplace about the quality, productivity, and viability of the firm. Firms undertake the 
act of signaling to influence shareholders’ impressions (Rynes, 1991), which Certo 
(2003) suggests garners greater shareholder interest and results in higher levels of firm 
performance.  
Information that conveys key attributes of the firm shape the impression 
individuals form of a firm (Reyes, 1991). Signaling theory describes the process 
individual decision makers use to resolve information asymmetry (Spence, 1973, 1974). 
Information asymmetry is present when a firm knows its intrinsic quality but outsiders 
(e.g., lenders, investors) do not (Connelly et al., 2011; Stiglitz, 2002). Firms with greater 
information asymmetry have more incentive to signal (Xue, 2005). Information 
asymmetry in various dimensions of the firm can result in unclear perceptions of the 
firm’s capabilities (Jones & Murrell, 2001). Reducing information asymmetry minimizes 





Higgins and Gulati (2006) suggest that the composition of the TMT can have a 
symbolic meaning beyond the functional nature of the TMT position. Certo (2003) 
suggests that the board of directors and board structure assume symbolic roles that are 
independent of the board’s tangible or functional activities; that is, each role can act as a 
symbol, signaling important non-financial information to investors when making 
purchase decisions about shares of initial public offerings. 
For these reasons, signaling theory focuses on the actions or attributes insiders 
intentionally use to communicate positive but otherwise imperceptible qualities 
(Connelly et al., 2011) about a firm’s products (Kirmani & Rao, 2000) or the firm itself 
(Ross, 1977). Firms signal to shape the impressions people form about the quality, 
productivity, and viability of the firm (Rynes, 1991) because impressions lead to 
investment decisions (Certo, 2003; Certo, Covin, Daily, & Dalton, 2001; Lester, Certo, 
Dalton, Dalton, & Cannella, 2006). Connelly et al. (2011) define firm quality as the 
underlying, unobservable ability of the signaler (firm) to fulfill the needs and demands of 
an outsider (stockholder) observing the signal.  
TMT characteristics used to convey firm quality include prestige of TMT 
members and their educational background (Lester et al., 2006), TMT heterogeneity 
(Zimmerman, 2008), TMT functional background (Hitt & Tyler, 1991), TMT experience 
(Cohen & Dean, 2005), and TMT composition (Higgins & Gulati, 2006). Levy and 
Lazarovich-Porat (1995) suggest that investors are willing to pay a higher price for a firm 
that signals its quality, ceteris paribus. The question I address here is: does CMO 






CMO Presence and Firm Performance 
From prior results, is it reasonable to predict that the presence/absence of a CMO 
on the TMT will directly affect firm performance? On the one hand, empirical research 
(i.e., Nath & Mahajan, 2008, 2011) specifically examining the direct effect of CMO 
presence on firm performance suggests that there is no direct effect. On the other hand, 
Abernathy et al., (2013) and Weinzimmer et al. (2003) suggest that firm performance is 
directly related to marketing’s inclusion on the TMT. 
Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) and Nath and Mahajan (2008, 2011) report no 
significant relationship in their empirical examinations of the impact of CMOs on firm 
performance. When examining strategic behavior and firm performance among family-
named firms, Kashmiri and Mahajan (2010) determine that the presence of a CMO on the 
TMT has no direct effect on firm performance. Nath and Mahajan (2008) find that CMO 
presence on the TMT has neither a direct positive nor a negative impact on firm 
performance despite other researchers finding a positive association between CMO 
presence and firm-level innovativeness (Klomp & Van Leeuwen, 2001), differentiation 
(Kale & Arditi, 2003), branding strategy (Morgan & Rego, 2009; Rumelt, 1982), and 
diversification (Varadarajan & Ramanujam, 1987), all firm traits previously associated 
with firm performance.  
Possible limitations in Nath and Mahajan’s (2008) study, however, may have led 
to inconclusive results. Limitations that may have reduced the statistical power of the 
analysis include the operational definition of a CMO (anyone with the term ”marketing” 
in their title), an artificial constraint of the data sample (included only firms with sales 





diverse (heavily skewed toward undifferentiated industries, such as large equipment 
manufacturing, and raw materials), and use of small sample size among the selected 
industries (50% of selected industries had fewer than seven observations each). In 
subsequent research focusing on CMO power in TMTs, Nath and Mahajan (2011) again 
find no direct relationship to firm performance but suggest that CMO presence can 
enhance firm performance under certain conditions. These conditions include when 
TMTs have a relatively high proportion of divisional heads, in which centralized efforts 
would yield greater performance, or when CMOs have additional responsibility for the 
sales function. 
 A different perspective is that the presence of a CMO on the TMT is perceived as 
a signal of the corporate adoption and corporate status of the marketing concept (Piercy, 
1986; Webster, 1981; Webster et al., 2003). Weinzimmer et al. (2003) empirically find 
that the inclusion of marketing expertise, as measured by the presence of a marketing 
executive (not necessarily a CMO) on the TMT, uniquely contributes to three key 
financial outcomes: sales growth, firm profitability, and shareholder wealth.  
Appointment of a CMO to the TMT is viewed as signaling a potential 
improvement in firm profitability (Kumar & Peterson, 2005; Narver & Slater, 1990). 
Although empirical research suggests that a CMO announcement is met in financial 
markets with positive results, this effect occurs only in the presence of moderating 
variables (Boyd et al., 2010; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). For example, Boyd et al. (2010) 
empirically find that the impact of a CMO announcement on firm value (stock price) is 





low (absence of a major customer), perceived managerial discretion is high and linked to 
higher stock values.  
Using signaling theory, Vafeas and Vlittis (2009) find that a favorable change in 
share price occurs for firms after a CMO announcement but is contingent on the profile 
of the appointee and the financial situation of the appointing firm rather than the 
announcement event itself. They observe abnormal stock returns when (1) the newly 
appointed CMO had prior marketing executive experience, (2) the CMO provided 
information on the firm’s future marketing strategy, and (3) the firm experienced poor 
stock price performance in the year before the appointment. Vafeas and Vlittis (2009) 
also find that financial markets view the appointment of a CMO unfavorably in highly 
differentiated industries, such as high-technology firms, because such an appointment is 
perceived as a negative signal about the present quality and future innovativeness of the 
firm’s product line. 
Thus, when present, the CMO position on the TMT has a moderating effect on 
firm-level outcomes, such as firm performance, and in accordance with signaling theory, 
the CMO position serves as a symbolic role as well as a functional role on the TMT. This 
conclusion is supported by prior research that suggests that the presence of a CMO on the 
TMT helps reduce information asymmetry (Brammer & Millington, 2006) by signaling 
important non-financial information, such as the presence of intangible assets or rare 
capabilities in the firm, to firm outsiders. In turn, this action reduces information 
asymmetry and influences the decisions of stockholders and investors (Connelly et al., 
2011) because investors are able to more accurately distinguish between high- and low-





rather than considering whether CMOs have a direct influence on firm performance, 
which has yielded mixed results in previous research, I propose that an indirect or 
moderating relationship exists between the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on 
three firm-level factors—firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation 
(differentiation)—and firm performance. The model in Figure 3 shows the relationships 
to be tested. 
 
Figure 3 





CMO Presence, Firm Visibility, and Firm Performance 
 
 Firm visibility reflects the extent to which analysts follow and institutions hold a 
firm’s stock (Baker, Powell, & Weaver, 1999). Firm visibility is important to firms for at 





asymmetry (Barry & Brown, 1986) and (2) it provides expert validation of a firm’s 
present worth and growth potential (Ikeler, 2007). Extant research has used firm visibility 
as a proxy for the quality of a firm’s informational environment (Lang, Lins, & Miller, 
2003).  
Merton (1987) suggests that visibility of a firm and its stock lowers cost of capital 
resulting in an increase in the market value of the firm’s shares. Using Merton’s model, 
Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) report empirical data that support Merton’s 
assertion that firm visibility reduces the cost of capital. Trueman (1996) finds a positive 
relationship between firm visibility and stock price. McConnell and Serveaes (1990) 
report a positive direct effect between greater visibility, as measured by the degree of 
shareholding of institutions and large block owners, and firm performance. Likewise, 
Kadlec and McConnell (1994) empirically demonstrate the relationship between firm 
visibility and market-based firm performance, as measured by abnormal increases in 
stock price. As such, the inclusion of institutional investors in this study is important 
because prior research reports that “relative to individual investors, the sophistication of 
institutional investors enables them to more effectively monitor managerial behavior” 
(Higgins & Gulati, 2006, p. 6).  
 Firms can increase visibility in several ways. One way is through the development 
of social capital. Social capital is an intangible, market-based asset capable of creating a 
competitive advantage (Bamford, Bruton, & Hinson, 2006). Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998, 
p. 243) define social capital as “the sum of actual and potential resources embedded with, 





individual or social unit.” Gargiulo and Rus (2002) suggest that the social network of a 
chief executive officer (CEO) is a good indicator of firm visibility.  
 Likewise, it is anticipated that the social capital of a CMO on the TMT 
simultaneously improves the informational environment and enhances firm visibility 
because external interactions of the TMT inherently create visibility while contributing 
information (Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Social capital can be obtained by a CMO 
through relationships with distributors, retailers, customers, and even government 
agencies (Griffith & Harvey, 2004; Srivastava, Shervani, & Fahey, 1998). Social capital 
of a newly hired CMO can also provide opportunities that otherwise may not have been 
available to the firm (Boyd et al., 2010; Griffith & Harvey, 2004). In addition, a CMO 
can acquire social capital by virtue of membership in social networks and global online 
resource groups (Porter, 1998), such as the CMO Council, the CMO Institute, and 
CMOsite.com, to name just a few.   
 Thus, in accordance with signaling theory (Spence, 1973, 1974), I propose that 
firms with a CMO on the TMT are better positioned to facilitate the relationship between 
firm visibility and firm performance than those without a CMO. This is anticipated 
because the CMO position signals the presence of intangible assets, such as social capital 
in the firm (Court, 2007; Nath & Mahajan, 2008). In this way, CMO presence on the 
TMT helps reduce the degree of information asymmetry between TMT executives and 
stakeholders (Brammer & Millington, 2006) while amplifying firm visibility. For these 
reasons, I hypothesize the following: 
H1: The relationship between firm visibility and firm performance is moderated by 
the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that when a CMO is present the 





CMO Presence, Market Power, and Firm Performance 
To achieve a competitive advantage in the marketplace, firms selectively choose 
their markets and strategically deploy valued resources (Kerin, Mahajan, & Varadarajan, 
1990). A primary way firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage is through 
differentiation (Porter, 1980). Prior research indicates that market power is related to a 
firm’s ability to differentiate (Hay, 2008; Nevo, 1999; Porter, 1998).  
 Market power is in part determined by the degree of advertising intensity and 
R&D intensity of a firm (Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Bain, 1956). The relationship 
among advertising intensity, profit margin, and firm performance has been empirically 
supported (Abernathy et al., 2013: Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Farris & Buzzell, 1979), 
as has the relationship among R&D intensity, profit margins, and firm performance 
(Abernathy et al., 2013; Andras & Srinivasan, 2003; Kotabe, 1990; Mansfield, 1981). 
Market power enables the firm to better leverage assets, enhance legitimacy, and obtain 
resources of higher quality (Baum & Oliver, 1991).   
 CMO presence on the TMT can facilitate the relationship between market power 
and firm performance in three ways. First, the CMO, by virtue of experience and 
educational background, helps the firm make better marketing decisions that improve 
firm performance (Pasa & Shugan, 1996), especially in industries with greater 
competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). Second, the value of firm-level resources, such as 
market power, is amplified through expert interpretation (Pasa & Shugan, 1996). Within 
the firm-level context, an organization’s functional expertise also confers greater power 
to the CMO to moderate firm performance in situations that provide managerial 





H2: The relationship between market power and firm performance is moderated 
by the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that when a CMO is present 
the relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is 
weaker. 
 
CMO Presence, Industry Orientation, and Firm Performance  
Hull and Rothenberg (2008) suggest industry orientation, or the differentiation 
within an industry, positively affects firm performance. Companies that differentiate 
themselves achieve above-average returns (Porter, 1980, 1996; Selling & Stickney, 
1989). Some industries, however, lend themselves to higher levels of differentiation than 
others, and there is evidence that industry-level factors, such as overall levels of 
differentiation, also affect performance (McGahan & Porter, 1997). Pasa and Shugan 
(1996) suggest that marketing capabilities lead to decisions that improve firm 
performance, especially in industries with greater competition (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990). 
Thus, it is anticipated that CMO presence moderates the relationship between 
industry orientation (differentiation) and firm performance for three reasons. First, 
marketing activities are a principal instrument for addressing the uncertainty inherent in 
differentiated industries and the CMO is best positioned to reduce the uncertainty. 
Second, differentiated industries place greater value on experimentation and new 
strategies, which are activities that fall within the domain of the CMO. Third, 
differentiated industries provide a broad range of behavior options that afford the CMO 
greater managerial discretion to leverage firm resources.  
Differentiated industries create environmental uncertainty because of the inherent 





environment have greater information processing needs than management executives in 
more stable industries (Dess & Beard, 1984). Khandwalla (1977) suggests that marketing 
activities are a principal instrument for addressing the uncertainty inherent in uncertain 
environments. Uncertainty related to new product or new market entries also requires the 
attention of functional experts, such as a CMO, because they approach potential problems 
with more understanding and frame problems more comprehensively (Read, Dew, 
Sarasvathy, Song, & Wiltbank, 2009). Nath and Mahajan (2011) suggest that compared 
with other TMT members, the CMO is best positioned to reduce TMT uncertainty given 
the customer-related human, institutional, relational, and organizational resources they 
control.  
Differentiated industries also place greater value on experimentation and new 
strategies because of the broad managerial latitude of available strategic choices (Datta, 
Rajagopalan, & Zhang, 2003). Knowledge gained through experimentation and firsthand 
experience is difficult to replicate and cannot be explicitly expressed or taught; as such, it 
is an intangible firm asset (Barney, 1991; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009) and a source for 
competitive advantage (Capron & Hulland, 1999). Firsthand experience also affects how 
managers approach and arrive at decisions (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). Thus, the ability to 
pursue experimentation is considered a valuable cognitive trait in top executives (Datta & 
Rajagopolan, 1998) and one that falls within the domain of the CMO (Aaker & 
Joachimsthaler, 2000).  
Signaling theory also supports the notion that the presence of a CMO on the TMT 
reduces information asymmetry because the position provides a basis for outsiders to 





CMO (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). These capabilities include marketing expertise 
(Weinzimmer et al., 2003), market sensing (Day, 1994), and managerial discretion (Boyd 
et al., 2010), all of which are important when attempting to enhance firm differentiation.  
Thus, it is anticipated that CMO presence on the TMT facilitates the relationship 
between differentiated industries and firm performance for two reasons. First, CMO 
presence on the TMT enhances the degree of firm differentiation so the firm will be more 
competitive. Second, the presence of a CMO on the TMT signals information about the 
firm to both investors and competitors, including firm strength, quality, and resource 
availability (Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009). Consequently, the presence of a CMO on the TMT 
should amplify the relationship between differentiated industries and firm performance, 
more so than firms participating in other, non-differentiated environments (Kohl & 
Jaworski, 1990; Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967).  
I posit that firms in differentiated industries with a CMO on the TMT are better 
positioned to enhance firm differentiation than those without because differentiated 
industries provide a broad range of behavior options (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). 
Differentiated industries also afford the CMO greater managerial discretion to leverage 
firm resources (Datta et al., 2003; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Thus, I hypothesize 
the following: 
H3: The relationship between industry orientation (differentiated industries) and firm 
performance is moderated by the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT such that 
when a CMO is present, the relationship is stronger, but when absent, the 










 Hierarchical regression was used to examine the moderating influence of CMO 
presence on the relationship between firm visibility, market power, and industry 
orientation and firm performance. Hierarchical regression was chosen because it is 
robust, measures both the relationship and the overall strength of the relationship between 
two variables (Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson, 2010), and has been used to test the 
relationships between organizational structures and environmental factors (e.g., Aldrich 
& Pfeffer, 1976; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978).  
For this sample, calendar years 2010 and 2011 were selected because this period 
provides a current reflection of TMT structure among U.S. firms and avoids the 2007–
2009 economic crises, noted by Business Wire, a global leader in financial and business 
news, as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s.  
 
Data Sources  
H1, H2, and H3 were tested using secondary data drawn from Capital IQ. 
Additional or missing data were obtained from annual reports, 10K reports, and other 
public sources, including Morningstar.com. This data included TMT size and verification 
of the presence or absence of a CMO on the TMT during the periods examined. The use 
of secondary data, public databases, and business press to acquire information on publicly 
traded firms is consistent with prior examinations of CMO presence and firm 
performance (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2010; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath 





reduces the likelihood of bias and enhances the generalizability of the research findings. 
This occurs because the population size from which to draw the sample tends to be 
larger; thus, the sample itself tends to be larger and more representative of the population 
than primary data-gathering techniques (Sorensen, Sabroe, & Olsen, 1996). Consistent 
with other studies (McGahan & Porter, 1997) using secondary data sources, this analysis 
excluded private firms because key variables of interest do not exist or are not reported 
by private firms.   
 
Sample and Sample Size 
 This initial data set consisted of a sample of 1,189 firms across 10 different 
industry groups randomly selected from more than 11,017 public U.S. firms one year or 
older available in the Capital IQ database. This study expands the scope of Nath and 
Mahajan’s (2008) examination of CMO influence on firm performance using two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification codes. One of the advantages of this study is that it uses 
the two-digit Global Industry Classification System (GICS). Prior research has shown 
that GICS codes enhance explanatory power, have a greater correlation across industry 
peer firms than the Fama–French classification system, and are more parsimonious 
(Chan, Lakonishok, & Swaminathan, 2007). Prior research also suggests that GICS is 
significantly better at explaining stock return co-movements, cross-sectional variations in 
valuation multiples, forecasted and realized growth rates, R&D expenditures, and other 
key financial ratios important to external investors across different-sized firms than other 





 In addition to an enhanced classification schema, other advantages of this sample 
include the diversity and number of observations per industry. At the two digit level, the 
composition of the total sample was as follows: 20 firms in Energy (GICS 10), 65 in 
Materials (GICS 15), 169 in Industrials (GICS 20), 293 in Consumer Discretionary 
(GICS 25), 62 in Consumer Staples (GICS 30), 247 in Health Care (GICS 35), 32 in 
Financials (GICS 40), 272 in Information Technology (GICS 45), 23 in 
Telecommunication Services (GICS 50), and 6 in Utilities (GICS 55). At the six digit 
level, 55 industries are represented. Finally, statistical power is gained from the large 
sample, which drew from all U.S. publicly traded firms, regardless of sales volume. In 
doing so, the data set was not artificially constrained and did not ignore small or newly 
established firms. In the past, research has limited sample composition to firms reporting 
total sales revenue of at least $250 million (Hambrick & Cannella, 2004; Nath & 
Mahajan, 2008). 
 Seventy seven observations were deemed to contain missing data and were 
discarded. The outlier labeling rule (Hoaglin & Iglewicz, 1987) helped identify data 
outliers within each continuous variable, and 54 were discarded, resulting in a total 
sample size of 1,058. The sample size provided more than the five observations per 
independent metric variable required for hierarchical multiple regression (Hair et al., 
2010). A Mahalanobis D
2
 analysis was conducted to identify multivariate outliers across 
all independent metric variables. No observations met or exceeded the threshold of .001 
or less (Hair et al., 2010, p. 66). The resulting sample included 239 observations with and 
819 observations without a titled CMO present on the TMT. The proportion of firms in 





19.6% reported by Nash and Mahajan (2008). Table 1 illustrates the range of CMO 
presence on the TMT by industry. Five industries (Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Financial, Information Technology, and Telecom) were over-indexed, while five 
industries (Energy, Materials, Industrials, Health Care, and Utilities) were under-indexed 
relative to the presence of a CMO on the TMT. 
 
Table 3 





 The dependent variable of interest is firm performance as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
Tobin’s Q refers to market capitalization plus the value of the firm’s preferred stock plus 
debt divided by total assets (Rao, Agarwal, & Dahlhoff, 2004). This market-based 
measure has been used extensively in prior financial and marketing literature (Lehmann, 
2004; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Rust, Ambler, Carpenter, Kumar, & Srivastava, 2004; 
Wernerfelt & Montgomery, 1988). Tobin’s Q is a measure that reflects the value of the 


















which the market values a firm relative to its replacement cost (Mehran, 2004). Many 
researchers prefer Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm performance because it is forward 
looking, is not susceptible to external influences (e.g., industry-specific accounting 
standards; Anderson, Fornell, & Mazvancheryl, 2004), and, of most relevance to this 
study, incorporates information from signals in a firm’s valuation (Xue, 2005). 
 
Explanatory Variables 
 Three independent contextual firm-level variables were examined: firm visibility, 
market power, and industry orientation. In addition, one moderating variable, CMO 
presence, was examined across all three hypotheses.  
 
Firm Visibility  
The construct of firm visibility consisted of two measures: the number of 
institutional shares outstanding and the number of institutional shareholders (Ackert & 
Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999; Barron, Byard, Kile, & Riedl, 2002). Both 
measures are widely used proxies for firm visibility and were obtained through the 
Capitol IQ database. Thus, the construct of firm visibility was measured as the sum of the 
geometric mean of the reported number of institutional shares outstanding (NOI) and the 
number of institutional shareholders (NOS) reported at the close of each calendar year 
observed. Use of the geometric mean serves to normalize the ranges of two types of 
variables being analyzed, avoids the issue that one range or variable dominates the 






Market Power  
 The construct of market power was operationalized with two measures in 
accordance with prior literature (Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Slotegraaf & Atuahene-Gima, 
2011): advertising intensity and research intensity. Advertising intensity was measured 
by annual advertising expenditures divided by annual sales revenue (Nath & Mahajan, 
2008; Willis & Rogers, 1998; Zhang, Zhu, Yue, & Zhu, 2010). Research intensity was 
measured by annual R&D expenses divided by annual sales (Nath & Mahajan, 2008; 
Slotegraaf & Atuahene-Gima, 2011). Research intensity affects systematic risk of the 
firm and analyst recommendations (Barth, Kasznik, & McNichols, 2001; McAlister, 
Srinivasan, & Kim, 2007). Because the nature of H2 also examines a theoretical 
construct, market power, it was measured as the sum of the geometric mean of annual 
advertising expenditures of the firm divided by annual sales revenue (AI) and the annual 
R&D expenses of the firm divided by annual sales (RI), reported at the close of each 
calendar year observed. 
 
Industry Orientation  
Industry orientation typically classifies industries as either “differentiated” or 
“non-differentiated,” but degrees of differentiation actually exist. In line with prior 
research (Grönroos, 1983), differentiated industries refer to industries that provide a 
variety of product or service offerings to meet the needs and wants of a heterogeneous 
population of customers. Differentiated industries are of interest because firms operating 
in differentiated industries are afforded a broad range of strategic options (Haleblian & 





Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988). Consistent with Hull and Rothenberg (2008) 
differentiated industries are measured using a multi-year average of the advertising 
intensity in each firm’s industry. Industries with higher advertising intensity are deemed 
to be highly differentiated industries while those with lower advertising intensity are 
deemed to be industries with low differentiation. Industry characteristics were ascertained 
by means of the six-digit industry code representing each firm’s dominant line of 
business, as determined by GICS. The degree of differentiation was measured by the 
geometric mean of two years of advertising intensity by industry then standardized using 
Z-score transformation to reflect the degree of differentiation among industries in the 
sample.  
 
CMO Presence  
Finally, the moderating condition of CMO presence/absence was determined 
through the use of title classifications that expressly state “chief marketing officer,” in 
keeping with prior research (Boyd et al., 2010). Examination of this characteristic as a 
moderating variable is supported by prior research (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al. 
2010; Michel & Hambrick, 1992; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Weinzimmer et al., 2003). The 
moderating variable in question—CMO presence/absence—is a categorical moderator 
that is non-metric in nature. For the purpose of this study, CMO presence on the TMT 









In accordance with prior research on TMTs and firm performance (Collins & 
Clark, 2003; Eaton & Rosen, 1983; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Michel & Hambrick, 
1992; Nath & Mahajan, 2008), three control variables were used: firm size, firm age, and 
TMT size. In addition, dummy variables were created and used as control variables for 
each industry. First, controlling for firm size addresses the likelihood that large firms 
have more resource advantages than small firms (Collins & Clark, 2003). Firm size was 
measured by the total number of employees (Boyd et al., 2010; Covin, Green, & Slevin, 
2006; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Newbert, 2007).  
 Second, prior research commonly recognizes firm age as influencing firm 
performance (Anderson & Reeb, 2004; Miller & Chen, 1996; O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007). 
Firm age was determined by the number of years a firm has been in business (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004; Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009; O’Sullivan & Abela, 2007).  
Third, prior research has shown that TMT size affects firm performance (Certo, 
Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993). Controlling for TMT 
size addresses the belief that TMT size determines the scope of the TMT’s information-
processing and decision-making capabilities (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993) and is in 
accordance with Carpenter, Geletkanycz, and Sanders’s (2004) call to control for team 
size when examining the effects of the TMT on firm outcomes. Including TMT size as a 
control also addresses the tendency of large firms to have a CMO on the TMT (Nath & 
Mahajan, 2008). In accordance with prior research (Carpenter et al., 2004; Walsh, 1989), 
TMT size was determined by examining each firm’s 10-K or annual report and counting 





Finally, controlling for industry membership addresses the effects of industry-
level variables on firm performance. These effects include profitability (Beard & Dess, 
1981), growth (Porter, 1980; Russo & Fouts, 1997), and volatility (Kotha & Swamidass, 
2000). Controlling for industry membership also addresses the likelihood that some 
industries provide greater firm visibility (Solomon, 2012) and market power (Comanor & 
Wilson, 1967). For the purpose of this study, industry membership was coded as 1 and 
non-membership as 0. 
 
Analysis 
 Because H1, H2, and H3 examine the moderating relationship between internal 
and firm-level contextual variables and a single dependent interval scale variable, 
hierarchical moderated regression was used. Prior research has deemed this manner of 
analysis appropriate (Cohen, Cohen, West, & Aiken, 2003; Hair et al., 2010; Matta & 
Beamish, 2008; Press & Wilson, 1978). This direction of analysis follows Cohen and 
Cohen’s (1983) suggestion to use moderating variables to identify and better understand 
the conditions under which hypotheses and theory hold. To express the direction of the 
relationship, one-tailed tests were used in each hypothesis (Hair et al., 2010). Skewness 
and kurtosis levels of the dependent and independent variables firm visibility and market 
power were logarithmically transformed to address positive skewness before analysis. 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Before the hierarchical moderated regression was run, bivariate correlations were 
examined. Except for the correlation between the moderating variable CMO presence (r = 
.663) and the interaction term CMO x Firm Visibility, no other correlations approached 
the .70 threshold suggested in prior research (Dorman et al., 2013; Hair et al., 2010).  
Because H1 and H2 contain a construct within each hypothesis, a geometric mean 
using two variables were created. For H1, the geometric mean of institutional shares and 
institutional shareholders was created to measure the reflective construct of firm visibility 
(Ackert & Athanassakos, 2001; Baker et al., 1999; Barron, et al., 2002). For H2, the 
geometric mean of advertising intensity and R&D intensity was created to measure the 
formative construct of market power (Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Slotegraaf & Atuahene-
Gima, 2011).  
To test H1, H2, and H3 (examining the moderating effects of CMO presence on 
the relationship between firm visibility, market power, and industry orientation and firm 
performance) an interaction variable was created for each. For H1, the interaction 
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and firm visibility (the geometric 
mean of institutional shares and institutional shareholders). For H2, the interaction 
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and firm market power (the 
geometric mean of advertising intensity and R&D intensity). For H3, the interaction 
variable was calculated by multiplying CMO presence and industry orientation (the 
standardized Z-score of industry advertising intensity). In line with prior literature 
(Afshartous & Preston, 2011; Aiken & West, 1991; Dawson, 2014; Marquardt, 1980), 
continuous variables (e.g. control variables) were mean centered before analysis to 





variable, variables of interest were also mean centered before the calculation of 
interaction terms and subsequent regression analysis (Cohen, et al., 2003, Dawson, 2014).  
Table 5 contains the hierarchical regression results used to test the hypothesized 
moderating relationships of CMO presence/absence on firm visibility (Model 1C), market 
power (Model 1D), and industry orientation (Model 1E) on firm performance. Variance 
inflation factor scores reported in the results were compared with the suggested cutoff 





Moderating Effect of CMO Presence on Firm Performance 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
Variables
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Step 1: Constant      1.097*** (.170)              1.101*** (.167)            1.105*** (.166)           1.103*** (.167)             1.119*** (.166)
Step 2: Control Variables  
Firm Size  .000 (.000)        .000 (.000)       .000 (.000)      .000 (.000)        .000 (.000)
Firm Age        -.001*** (.000)              -.001*** (.000)             -.001*** (.000)             -.001*** (.000)            -.001** (.000)
TMT Size  .003 (.006)            -.018** (.006)           -.018** (.006)          -.018** (.006)            -.018** (.006)
Ind - Energy  .113 (.194)        .070 (.189)       .067 (.189)       .071 (.190)        .061 (.189)
Ind - Materials  .076 (.177)        .056 (.173)       .057 (.173)      .055 (.173)        .041 (.173)
Ind - Industrials -.059 (.173)      -.072 (.169)      -.071 (.169)     -.073 (.169)       -.085 (.169)
Ind - Consumer Discretionary -.016 (.171)       -.021 (.169)      -.023 (.169)     -.024 (.169)       -.041 (.169)
Ind - Consumer Staples  .076 (.180)        .122 (.180)       .131 (.180)       .115 (.181)        .105 (.180)
Ind - Healthcare  .242 (.172)        .226 (.169)       .230 (.169)       .229 (.169)        .210 (.169)
Ind - Financials -.164 (.189)       -.098 (.189)      -.092 (.188)     -.094 (.189)       -.113 (.189)
Ind - IT  .131 (.172)        .090 (.169)       .090 (.168)      .088 (.169)        .073 (.169)
Ind - Telecomm -.118 (.190)       -.123 (.199)      -.124 (.189)     -.126 (.189)       -.128 (.189)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility               .148*** (.024)              .163*** (.024)             .148*** (.024)               .147*** (.024)
Market Power             .152** (.054)            .153** (.054)        .135* (.057)            .152** (.054)
Industry Orientation       -.015 (.015)      -.015 (.015)     -.016 (.015)        .005 (.018)
CMO Presence        .042 (.035)         .101* (.042)      .044 (.035)        .050 (.035)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
CMO Presence X Firm Visibility          -.148** (.058)
CMO Presence X Market Power      .187 (.191)
CMO Presence X Industry Orientation         -.065* (.028)
Overall Model R²         .092***              .138***           .143**      .139          .142*
Adjusted R²    .081        .125      .129      .125        .128
Change in R²    .092       .046      .005      .001        .005
n = 1,058
CMO Presence: 1= Present, 0= Absent.
Dependant variable: Tobin's Q.
Change in R²  reported for Model 1C, 1D and 1E over Model 1B.
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  One-tailed test.





The first part in the hierarchical regression (Model 1A) included only the control 
variables. The overall control model is statistically significant (R
2
 = .092, p = .000). 
Among the control variables, only firm age (β = -.001, p = .001) was significant.  
The second part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1B) measured the direct 
effects of the independent variables. The addition to the model of firm visibility, market 
power, industry orientation, and CMO presence was statistically significant (R
2
 = .138, p 
= .000) and represented a significant change in R
2
 over the inclusion of the control 
variables alone (change in R
2
 = .046, p = .000). Regarding the direct effect of the 
independent variables on firm performance, firm visibility was positive and statistically 
significant (β = .148, p = .000), and market power was positive and statistically 
significant (β = .152, p = .005). However, industry orientation (β = -.015, p = .325) and 
CMO presence (β = .042, p = .225) were non-significant. 
The third part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1C) measured the interaction 
effect of CMO presence on firm visibility and firm performance. The addition of the 
moderating variable was negative but statistically significant (β = -.148, p = .010) and 
represented a small change in R
2
 over the main effects Model 1B (change in R
2
 = .005, p 
= .010).  
The fourth part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1D) measured the 
interaction effect of CMO presence on market power and firm performance. The addition 
of the moderating variable was not statistically significant (β = .187, p = .326) and 
represented no meaningful change in R
2
 (change in R
2
 = .001, p = .326) over the main 
effects Model 1B. The fifth part of the hierarchical regression (Model 1E) measured the 





addition of the moderating variable was statistically significant but negative (β = -.065, p 
= .019) and represented a small change in R
2
 over the main effects Model 1B (change in 
R
2
 = .005 p = .019). 
For H1, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence  
with firm visibility was significant but negative (β = –.148, p = .010). Thus, this finding 
does not support H1: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the 
relationship between firm visibility and firm performance such that when a CMO is 













Figure 4 illustrates the interaction effect of firm visibility and firm performance 
when a CMO is present or absent on the TMT. In situations where firm visibility is low, 
the presence of a CMO enhances the relationship between firm visibility and firm 
performance. However, when firm visibility is high, they do not.   
For H2, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence 
with market power was non-significant (β = .187, p = .326). Thus, this finding does not 
support H2: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the relationship 
between market power and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the 
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. 
For H3, the regression coefficients show that the interaction of CMO presence 
with industry orientation is significant but negative (β = –.065, p = .019). Thus, this 
finding does not support H3: The presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT moderates the 
relationship between industry orientation (differentiated industries) and firm 
performance, such that in differentiated industries when a CMO is present, the 






















Figure 5 illustrates the interaction effect of industry orientation (differentiation) 
and firm performance when a CMO is present or absent on the TMT. In situations where 
industry differentiation is low, the presence of a CMO enhances the relationship between 
industry differentiation and firm performance. However, when industry differentiation is 
high, they do not.   
Finally, because Nath and Mahajan (2008) broadly define CMO presence as any 
executive on the TMT with the term “marketing” in his or her title, additional analysis 
was conducted to examine each hypothesis using the broader definition of a CMO.
3
 
Findings are reported in Appendix 1. Using the broader definition of a CMO, this study 
found that the position still fails to directly affect firm performance (β = –.042, p = .129), 
                                                     
3 In addition to CMO, titles included vice president marketing, senior vice president 
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consistent with prior research findings (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath & Mahajan, 
2008, 2011). Furthermore, using the broader definition of a CMO, none of the hypotheses 
were supported or statistically significant.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The goal of this study was to add empirical evidence to the emerging scholarly 
discussion (Abernathy et al., 2013; Boyd et al., 2010; Moorman & Rust, 1999; Nath & 
Mahajan, 2008; Srivastava et al., 1998; Vafeas & Vlittis, 2009; Webster et al., 2003; 
Weinzimmer et al., 2003) on the financial impact of having a CMO on the TMT. I 
hypothesized that CMO presence contributes to firm performance by signaling the 
presence and quality of firm-level resources. The application of signaling theory in this 
manner recognized and examined the signaling effect of CMO presence on the TMT on 
firm performance (Connelly et al., 2011; Jones & Murrell, 2001; Spence, 1973, 1974). 
The use of Tobin’s Q as the measure of performance was based on the notion that it 
reflects the value of the firm as perceived by its shareholders (Nath & Mahajan, 2008) 
and incorporates information signals (Xue, 2005). 
 Thus, this study attempted to examine the explanatory power of signaling theory 
by theorizing that creating a CMO position acts as a sufficient signal to the marketplace 
to moderate firm performance. Specifically, this study examined the moderating 
influence of the presence/absence of a CMO on the TMT on three firm-level factors—
firm visibility, firm market power, and firm industry orientation (differentiation)—each 





Chung & Jo, 1996; Farris & Buzzell, 1979; Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Kotabe, 1990; 
Mansfield, 1981; McGahan & Porter, 1997). 
 I hypothesized (H1) that CMO presence would moderate the relationship between 
firm visibility and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the relationship is 
stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. I further hypothesized 
(H2) that CMO presence would moderate the relationship between firm market power 
and firm performance, such that when a CMO is present, the relationship is stronger, but 
when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. Finally, I hypothesized (H3) that CMO 
presence would moderate the relationship between industry orientation and firm 
performance, such that in differentiated industries when a CMO is present, the 
relationship is stronger, but when a CMO is absent, the relationship is weaker. 
I found the presence of a CMO on the TMT overall negatively moderated the 
relationship between firm visibility and firm performance; thus, H1 was not supported. 
One reason for this finding may be because the social capital of CMO’s are low given the 
low incidence of the position on TMTs in several industries. However, while H1 was not 
supported, I discovered an interaction that represents an important finding, one that sheds 
new light on conditions under which a CMO may favorably influence firm performance 
and that can be explained through the lens of signaling theory. As suggested in Chart 1, 
having a CMO on the TMT is one way a firm with low firm visibility can moderate firm 
performance and, ultimately, firm visibility. By including a CMO on the TMT, a firm 
with low visibility could be interpreted by the market as signaling that the firm has 
unique resources and is going to undertake initiatives in the future that enhance its firm 





a CMO on the TMT could attract sufficient attention to compel more market analysts to 
take note of and to initiate coverage of that firm. This would in turn lead to increased firm 
visibility up to the tipping point at which a firm no longer receives signaling benefits 
associated with a CMO on the TMT. Both possible scenarios offer an explanation of this 
interaction through the lens of signaling theory. 
This study suggested that the presence of a CMO on the TMT would moderate the 
relationship between market power and firm performance, but no statistically significant 
support for H2 was found.  One possible explanation for the lackluster firm performance 
in the presence of high market power may be that marketing strategies were not aligned 
with overall business strategies (Slater & Olson, 2001). For example, one of the primary 
tasks of marketing is relationship management and the formation and management of 
strategic alliances (Webster, 1992). Another possible explanation may be that creating 
market power is inherently resource intensive and profit dilutive and eventually reaches a 
point of diminishing returns. 
 Finally, this study suggested that the presence of a CMO on the TMT would 
moderate the relationship between industry orientation and firm performance; however, 
no support for H3 was found. This may be because innate environmental forces within 
differentiated industries provide a broader array of competitive actions (Porter, 1980), 
offsetting the impact of functional diversity in the TMT, such as having a CMO. Mauri 
and Michaels (1998) empirically suggest that industry effects are more important than 
firm effects on firm performance in two instances: technology and marketing strategies. 
An industry’s life cycle may also alter the influence of CMO presence on the TMT, such 






The intended contribution of this study was to expand the scope of scholarly 
inquiry to include CMO relationships (firm visibility, market power, and industry 
orientation) that previous research had not specifically or empirically explored. The 
primary contribution of this study is that it provides support for the notion that having 
someone with the CMO title on the TMT can moderate firm performance under certain 
conditions. One such condition is low firm visibility. In keeping with prior literature, this 
study provided additional empirical support that the CMO position, defined narrowly or 
broadly, does not directly enhance firm performance (Kashmiri & Mahajan, 2010; Nath 
& Mahajan, 2008, 2011). The findings also support the notion that a CMO has signaling 
power in certain conditions, sufficient to convey to outsiders that the firm may or may not 
possess intangible assets or will undertake potential actions to enhance firm performance, 
following the findings of Vafeas and Vlittis (2009).    
 
Managerial Implications 
From this examination, five implications for firms arise. First, firms should 
recognize that external stakeholders may not always perceive some positions on the 
TMT, such as the CMO, as a signal. This may occur because the CMO position is still 
relatively new within the C-suite and adoption of the position in TMTs remains low, 
especially in some industries. This is not to suggest that the contributions of CMOs are 
less important than those of other functional positions; rather, their ability to 
communicate positive but otherwise imperceptible firm qualities to outsiders may be 





Second, this study provides support for the inclusion of a CMO on the TMT under 
certain conditions. One such condition occurs when firm visibility is low. Third, 
managers should recognize that external stakeholders view the title of CMO differently 
than that of other marketing titles (i.e., vice president marketing, senior vice president 
marketing, or executive vice president marketing) that may be represented on the TMT. 
Specifically, my study suggests that unless the TMT includes someone with the specific 
title of CMO, signaling power sufficient to moderate firm level resources on firm 
performance may not be achieved. Fourth, managers should recognize that while the 
inclusion of a CMO on the TMT may not directly affect or moderate firm performance in 
every situation, the position does enhance functional diversity of the TMT (Michel & 
Hambrick, 1992; Pegels, Song, &Yang, 2000; Weinzimmer et al., 2003; Wiersema & 
Bantel, 1992). The CMO position also serves to elevate marketing issues to the corporate 
level (Kerin, 2005; McGovern et al., 2004) and provides a way for the firm to meet the 
ongoing demand for firm-level information by capital market actors. Finally, the 
increased presence of CMOs in industries like Consumer Discretionary, Consumer 
Staples, Financial, Information Technology, and Telecommunications suggest there may 




 The primary limitation of this study was the inability to reject the null hypotheses 
in one of the three instances. It should be noted this study had several other minor 





sample is limited to being comprised of only publicly traded firms. As a result, my 
sample may be biased because it did not include smaller or younger firms that typically 
are not publicly traded. This data set was further limited when publicly traded firms 
elected, for competitive or other reasons, not to report advertising or R&D expenditures 
during the period examined. The data set was also limited to U.S. firms and observations 
taken within a two year period.  
Second, most observations from the Energy and Utility industries were not 
included in the final data set because one or more of the data points were deemed outliers 
from the overall data set and were discarded. Third, this study did not specifically control 
for performance variation across firms; rather only firm-level characteristics previously 
suggested to influence firm performance were included. Similarly, this study did not 
control for variations in CMO power (Nath & Mahajan, 2011), managerial discretion 
(Boyd et al., 2010), or alignment of marketing strategies with overall business strategies 
(Slater & Olsen, 2001), all previously suggested to influence performance variation 
because this study was limited to secondary data. Clearly, more empirical work is needed 
to define and understand the nature of the relationship between CMO presence and firm 
performance. Overcoming the limitations of this study, particularly controlling for 
performance variation, such as CMO power (Nath & Mahajan, 2011), offers future 
scholars several areas for further investigation. 
 
Future Research 
Within the context of this study, several questions remain. Foremost, why do 





concentrations of CMOs on the TMT while others do not? Does the degree of social 
capital of a CMO influence their ability to moderate environmental conditions? This 
study suggests that future research comparing firms with and without a CMO on the TMT 
within these industries would be worthwhile. The outcome of this study also suggested 
differences exist between a titled CMO and someone with “marketing” in their title on 
the TMT. Understanding these differences could further aid firms in decisions about 
TMT structure.  
Given the average tenure of the CMO position is just 45 months (Spencer Stuart, 
2013); future research should examine the role of duration of CMO tenure, past and 
present, as a signal to external stakeholders. Spencer Stuart (2013) reports that CMO 
tenure also varies across industries with the shortest tenure in the automotive, restaurant, 
and communications/media sectors, averaging between 27 to 31 months, while the 
average CMO tenure in technology industries averages 64 months. Thus, a longitudinal 
research design could yield important results. Conversely, future research should also 
examine the possibility that CMO presence on the TMT may send negative signals to 
stakeholders similar to those observed in this study or after CMO appointments (Vafeas 
& Vlittis, 2009). Likewise, future research is warranted to gain a better understanding of 
the differences, both perceived and functional, between the CMO position and alternative 
marketing titles that frequently appear on the TMT. Revisiting prior study designs may 
also be warranted using the narrower definition of a CMO.   
Further research examining the relationship between CMO presence and firm 
performance should examine the relationship through a different theoretical lens such as 





moderating relationship or measure of firm performance than I examined, shedding much 
needed light on why some firms or industries value a CMO on the TMT while others do 
not. Examining conditions such as managerial uncertainty or firm legitimacy in the case 
of new firms may suggest a more appropriate theory to better illuminate the value of a 
CMO on the TMT. Research that finds statistically significant relationships in these areas 
will be of value to scholars, firms, and stakeholders alike.  
 
Conclusion  
In conclusion, was it reasonable to predict that the presence/absence of a CMO on 
the TMT would moderate the relationship between firm visibility, firm market power, 
and industry orientation and firm performance? Conflicting prior research on the direct 
effect (i.e., Abernathy et al., 2013; Nath & Mahajan, 2008; Weinzimmer et al., 2003) 
suggests that further empirical examination was warranted. While no direct effect on firm 
performance was observed in this study, empirical support was found for the moderating 
influence of CMO presence on the relationship between firm visibility and firm 
performance, and industry orientation and firm performance, albeit not as hypothesized. 
Perhaps more important, my findings suggest moderating relationships exist between 
CMO presence and firm performance that are conditional in nature. For example, the 
interaction observed between firm visibility and firm performance when a CMO is 
present or when industry orientation (differentiation) is low, provides valuable new 






Analysis using a broader title definition of CMO (any title that included 
“marketing”) similar to Nath and Mahajan (2008; 2011) failed to find a direct effect of 
CMO presence on firm performance or reject the null hypotheses proposed in all three 
models. Thus, regardless of CMO definition, my findings were consistent with prior 
research that suggested no direct relationship between CMO presence on the TMT and 
firm performance (Nath & Mahajan, 2008, 2011). Finally, the use of signaling theory 
may have been premature because the CMO position, relative to other, more established 
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Moderating Effect of CMO Presence Using Broader Definition on Firm Performance 
Hierarchical Multiple Regression Analysis
Variables
B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE) B (SE)
Step 1: Constant       1.097*** (.170)            1.119*** (.167)           1.118*** (.167)         1.119*** (.167)         1.115*** (.167)
Step 2: Control Variables
Firm Size   .000 (.000)        .000 (.000)       .000 (.000)     .000 (.000)     .000 (.000)
Firm Age       -.001** (.000)           -.001** (.000)            -.001*** (.000)          -.001*** (.000)        -.001** (.000)
TMT Size   .003 (.006)           -.017** (.006)          -.017** (.006)        -.017** (.006)        -.018** (.006)
Ind - Energy   .113 (.194)        .077 (.189)       .078 (.189)     .075 (.190)     .078 (.189)
Ind - Materials   .076 (.177)        .052 (.173)       .055 (.173)     .051 (.173)     .053 (.173)
Ind - Industrials  -.059 (.173)      -.065 (.169)      -.064 (.169)    -.065 (.169)    -.063 (.169)
Ind - Consumer Discretionary  -.016 (.171)       -.002 (.169)      -.004 (.169)    -.004 (.169)     .001 (.169)
Ind - Consumer Staples   .076 (.180)        .145 (.180)       .139 (.180)     .146 (.181)     .148 (.180)
Ind - Healthcare  .242 (.172)        .222 (.169)       .222 (.169)     .220 (.169)     .226 (.169)
Ind - Financials -.164 (.189)       -.081 (.189)      -.090 (.189)    -.082 (.189)    -.075 (.189)
Ind - IT  .131 (.172)        .114 (.169)       .111 (.168)     .114 (.169)     .117 (.169)
Ind - Telecomm -.118 (.190)       -.105 (.189)      -.110 (.189)    -.104 (.189)    -.101 (.189)
Step 3: Main Effects
Firm Visibility              .162*** (.023)             .146*** (.028)           .162*** (.023)           .162*** (.023)
Market Power           .156** (.054)           .152** (.054)         .173** (.062)         .160** (.054)
Industry Orientation       -.014 (.015)      -.014 (.015)    -.015 (.015)    -.025 (.021)
CMO / Any Marketing Presence       -.042 (.028)       -.041* (.028)     .043 (.035)     .042 (.028)
Step 4: Moderated Variables
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Firm Visibility      .040 (.039)
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Market Power   -.066 (.119)
CMO / Any Mktg Presence X Industry Orientation   -.019 (.026)
Overall Model R²        .092***             .139***          .139**    .139    .139
Adjusted R² .081      .125      .125    .125    .125
Change in R² .092      .047      .001    .000    .000
n = 1,058
CMO Presence / Any Marketing Title on TMT: 1= Present, 0= Absent.
Dependant variable: Tobin's Q.
Change in R²  reported for Model 1C, 1D and 1E over Model 1B.
Unstandardized coefficients and standard error reported.
*=.05,**=.01, ***=.001  One-tailed test.
Model 1A Model 1B Model 1C Model 1D Model 1E
